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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, state governments have had to struggle against an ad-
verse economic climate consisting of rapidly changing inflation rates,
severe recession, and sharp reductions in federal grants.1 Although
the states have dealt with these severe conditions by raising taxes and
imposing spending restraints,2 their budgets remain in constant need
of adjustment to react to the present instability of the economy. It is
not surprising that a judicial opinion upsetting this fiscal balance
would send a state scurrying to try to correct the tragedy as best, and
as soon, as possible. In Kellogg Company v. Herrington, 3 the Nebraska
Supreme Court thrust the revenue position of Nebraska into confu-
sion in its first interpretation of Nebraska's income tax statute on mul-
tijurisdictional corporations. 4
1. See Manvel, Trends in State Tax Yields, 19 TAx NOTES 1004, 1004-06 (1983).
2. See Recession Was Main Cause of Widespread State Tax Increases, 21 TAx NOTES
63, 63-64 (1983) (summarizing the National Conference of State Legislature re-
port). The major factor accounting for the large number of tax increases was the
recession and the previous reduction caused by the tax revolt in the 1970's. See
id. However, despite these recent efforts to raise revenues by increasing estab-
lished taxes and creating new taxes, state revenues have not increased signifi-
cantly. See Manvel, supra note 1, at 1004-06. Reports show that state and local
aggregate tax revenues increased by 9.5 percent which was similar to the in-
creases for the previous three to four years. In addition, local tax revenues made
up most of the increases. See Manvel, The Recent Shift in Tax Trends, 20 TAX
NOTES 892, 892-94 (1983).
3. 216 Neb. 138, 343 N.W.2d 326 (1984).
4. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2734(2) to -2752 (1981 & Supp. 1983). Multijurisdictional
corporations are corporations which in some aspects do business in more than one
state or country. These corporations are commonly referred to as unitary busi-
nesses, interstate companies, or multistate or multinational corporations. See in-
fra text accompanying note 27. For the purposes of unitary taxation,
multijurisdictional corporations are corporations engaging in activities in more
than one taxing jurisdiction which might conceivably be subject to tax liability by
several jurisdictions. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 69-70 (1964) [herein-
after cited as WILLIS REPORT]. A multijurisdictional corporation may be either a
single corporation or several corporations that are mutually dependent in a uni-
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Nebraska imposes an income tax on the federal taxable income of
corporations doing business both in Nebraska and in another taxing
jurisdiction.5 Even though a corporation derives income6 from activi-
ties in several states, Nebraska only taxes that income attributable to
the corporation's activities in Nebraska.7 The portion of a corpora-
tion's federal taxable income attributable to Nebraska, and thereby
subject to Nebraska's income tax, is generally determined by appor-
tioning the corporation's total federal taxable income by a three-factor
formulas consisting of the values of a corporation's property, payroll,
and sales.9 The process of taxing multijurisdictional corporations by
using an apportionment formula is commonly known as unitary taxa-
tion.1O Prior to Kellogg Company, Nebraska's Department of Revenue
had been computing the three-factor formula based on the value of the
corporation's property, payroll, and sales within the United States. 11
The Kellogg Company case significantly altered the department's
procedure.
The supreme court in Kellogg Company determined that the stat-
ute required a corporation's income to include only federal taxable in-
come 12 and that the income must be apportioned on a worldwide basis
as opposed to a domestic basis.13 The mathematical effect of Kellogg
Company was to substantially lower the fraction by which the income
of the corporation was multiplied.14 The financial effect of the case
tary sense. See J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 8.11[1] (1983). See also infra
notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734(2) (Supp. 1983). This paper discusses Nebraska's origi-
nal income tax on multijurisdictional corporations in section III, A. In 1984, the
legislature amended the original scheme to override Kellogg Company. The
amended scheme is analyzed in section III, D.
6. Several terms are used to describe the income that is apportioned. Examples of
those terms include: interstate income (as opposed to intrastate income derived
specifically from one state), taxable income, unitary income, and income from
multijurisdictional corporations. Generally, these terms denote income earned
by a corporation from activities in several states. See infra text accompanying
note 19.
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2743(2) (1981). The United States Supreme Court has held
that the United States Constitution requires income to be reasonably attributed
to the taxing state before it can be taxed. See Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 69
(1920). See also infra note 106 and accompanying text.
8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2743(2) (1981). See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
10. See Weissman, Unitary Taxation: Its History and Recent Supreme Court Treat-
men; 48 ALB. L. REV. 48 (1983). When a unitary tax is applied to more than one
corporation, combined reporting is the term normally used to describe the pro-
cess of taxation. See id.
11. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 263-68.
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was to significantly lower the corporation's income tax liability.15
The purpose of this Article is to outline the basic mechanics of uni-
tary taxation; to explore the options available to the states in taxing
multijurisdictional corporations; to investigate the constitutional re-
strictions on the ability to tax unitary business; and to argue that, if
uniformity among the states cannot be achieved, then at best internal
uniformity in the way a particular state's formula is applied should be
maintained. 16 To achieve these objectives, this Article will: (1) ana-
lyze state taxation of multijurisdictional corporations in general; and
(2) analyze Nebraska's taxation of multijurisdictional corporations, fo-
cusing on (a) the statutory development in Nebraska, (b) the Kellogg
Company case, (c) the effect of Kellogg Company, and (d) the legisla-
tive response to Kellogg Company.
An analysis of state taxation in general and state taxation of mul-
tijurisdictional corporations in particular is exceedingly complex, and
Nebraska's taxation methods are no exception. 17 As a result of the
complexity, an overview of general state taxation of multijurisdic-
15. See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
16. The subject of unitary taxation is a complex area and few sources are written to
be used as an introductory source. Given the fact that many legislatures will
probably be dealing with unitary taxation in the future, this paper attempts to be
an introductory source for those individuals unfamiliar with the subject.
17. The general tax schemes implemented to collect needed state revenues vary
widely from state to state. See Kieschnick, Taxes and Growth Business Incentives
and Economic Development, in STATE TAxATION POLICY 155, 157, 160 (M. Baker
ed. 1983); Vaughan, State Taxation and Economic Development, in STATE TAxA-
TION POLICY 3, 40 (M. Baker ed. 1983). The many different types of state taxes,
the different tax base definitions, and the lack of publicly available data renders
the research and understanding of state tax systems a complex matter. See
Kieschnick, supra, at 157.
An additional hinderance to the understanding of the various state tax
schemes is the historic evolution of the tax laws. The importance of various tax
schemes among states has changed dramatically over the years. For example, the
state property tax has declined so that presently, the property tax is largely only
used by local governments. On the other hand, sales taxes have significantly in-
creased. Personal income taxes have also increased steadily while corporate in-
come tax revenues have remained relatively stable. See Kieschnick, supra, at
157-60.
Although state tax schemes are as varied as constitutions and imaginations
will allow, certain tax schemes recur from state to state. These recurring themes
include taxes on estates, gifts, inheritances, fuel, tobacco, minerals, alcohol, sales,
property, franchises, and income. For information on the basic and supplemental
tax schemes in each state, see 1 ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) 900-50 (1983) and 1 ST. &
Loc. TAX SERV. (P-H) 200 (1983). The major state tax schemes in Nebraska
include the sales and use tax, gasoline and special fuel tax, and the income tax.
Sales and use taxes were enacted in Nebraska in 1967. Sales, Use, Income,
Franchise Tax Act, ch. 487, § 377(a)(3), 1967 Neb. Laws 1533, 1543. Sales taxes are
levied on gross receipts of retail sales, leases, or rentals. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-
2703(1) (Supp. 1983). Use taxes reach the use and exercise of any right over prop-
erty or services in Nebraska if not taxed under the sales tax. See NEB. REV. STAT.
[Vol. 64:135
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tional corporations is helpful in understanding how Nebraska taxes
these businesses.
II. STATE TAXATION OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
CORPORATIONS IN GENERAL
A. The General Theory
Taxing corporate income is a relatively simple task for the state if
the corporate income is produced solely from activities within a state.
All of the "intrastate" income generated is taxed by the state.18 The
complexities arise when a corporation produces "interstate" income;
i.e., a corporation domiciled in one state does business in one or several
other taxing jurisdictions and generates income that may be subject to
taxation in all of the jurisdictions involved.19 Since the United States
Supreme Court has held that a state may only tax income which is
reasonably attributable to activities within the taxing state,20 the com-
plexities evolve from problems encountered in determining what por-
tion of a multijurisdictional corporation's interstate income may be
reasonably attributed to sources or activities within any particular tax-
ing state.2 ' Three general theories have been developed to determine
what portion of a corporation's interstate income may be reasonably
attributed to a taxing state and thereby be properly taxed by the state.
These theories include: specific allocation, separate accounting, and
apportionment.22
§ 77-2703(2) (Supp. 1983). The fuel tax is located in NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 66-401 to -
481 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
Nebraska's income tax is levied on income of the individual, estate, trust, part-
ner, and corporation. See 1 ST. TAx GUIDE (CCH) 927 (1983). The application of
Nebraska's corporate income tax depends upon whether the corporation does
business only in Nebraska or in other states or countries as well as in Nebraska.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734 (Supp. 1983). A direct income tax is imposed on the
net income of corporations engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce
or both. A franchise tax is imposed on all corporations having franchises or doing
business in Nebraska in a corporate capacity. But see infra note 115.
18. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2734(1) (Supp. 1983)("tax is ... imposed... on the
taxable income derived from sources within this state of any corporation ...
whose business within this state during the taxable year consists exclusively of
foreign commerce, interstate commerce, or both").
19. See Comment, State Taxation of Interstate Businesses and the Multistate Tax
Compac The Search for a Delicate Uniformity, 11 COLum. J.L. & Soc. PROBs.
231, 232 (1975) (argues for uniformity in the area of state taxation of multijuris-
dictional corporations); Comment, State Taxation of Corporate Income: Formu-
lating Apportionment of Income Earned in Interstate Commerce, 48 Mo. L. REV.
719, 720-21 (1983) (reviews the income taxation of multijurisdictional corporations
in Missouri) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Formulating Apportionment].
20. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920).
21. See Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Income Taxation of Multistate-Mul-
tinational Businesses, 10 URB. LAW 181, 181 (1978).
22. The terms "allocation" and "apportionment" are often used interchangeably in
1985]
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Specific allocation is used to tax income of a corporation that may
be traced to a single source within the taxing state. Generally, specific
allocation of income applies to income and property that is not associ-
ated with the corporation's business activity. 23
Separate accounting treats a certain geographic or functional area
of a corporation's business separate from the rest of the business.24
Separate accounting is generally only applied when a state can accu-
rately determine that an "income-producing" activity has occurred
within the taxing state and that the activity is separate from other
"income-producing" activities outside the taxing state.2 5
Apportionment is applied when "enterprises conduct multistate
businesses where income cannot be separately identified on a geo-
graphic basis by either specific allocation or separate accounting." 26
The tax liability of these multijurisdictional corporations, commonly
referred to as "unitary" businesses, can actually only be determined
by apportioning their taxable income. Apportionment of income re-
quires a factor to be applied to divide the income of a multijurisdic-
tional corporation among those states where the corporation is doing
business.27 Even though an apportionment formula may result in only
an estimate of the corporate income actually earned in the taxing
state, the United States Supreme Court has upheld apportionment for-
mulas as long as the income tax result is not out of proportion to the
corporation's activities in the state.28
judicial decisions and statutes dealing with the division of income among the
states. However, recently the terms have taken on independent significance.
"Allocation" is used to refer to the attribution of a particular type of income to a
designated state. "Apportionment" refers to attributing the income to a state by
a formula. See generally J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 4, at 8.4 to 8.5.
23. Id. For examples of the uses and problems with specific allocation, see Heller-
stein, supra note 4, at 1 8.3, and Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijuris-
dictional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.. 5076, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 113, 116-17 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hellerstein, State Income Taxation].
Nebraska provides for specific allocation of income received from certain proper-
ties. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2738 to -2742 (1981).
24. See Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 23, at 117.
25. Id. See also J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 4, at 1 8.3. Nebraska provides for sepa-
rate accounting to be used when the income derived from Nebraska is "separate
and distinct" from income derived from outside Nebraska. See NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 77-2743(1) (1981). Nebraska allows a corporation to request that its income be
taxed by the separate accounting method if the specific allocation and apportion-
ment methods do not "fairly represent the taxpayer's taxable income that is rea-
sonably attributed to business or earnings." NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2752(1)(a)
(1981).
26. See Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 23, at 117. Nebraska statutes
provide that if corporate income derived from Nebraska "cannot be readily sepa-
rated from the [income] derived from sources without Nebraska, the apportion-
ment method shall be used." NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2743(2) (1981).
27. See infra notes 43-61, 200-01 and accompanying text.
28. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North Carolina ex. rel. Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682, 688-90 (1936).
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The three methods developed to attribute the taxable income of a
corporation to a taxing jurisdiction are not mutually exclusive. A cor-
poration may use all three methods to determine its taxable income.2 9
For example, royalties from oil and mineral deposits owned by a cor-
poration may be allocated to the state where the underlying property
is located, excluding other states from imposing a tax.30 Nonunitary
income produced by a separate facet of the corporation may be taxed
only by the state where the income was generated by using separate
accounting. Conversely, unitary income produced from corporate ac-
tivities evidencing an interconnection between activities in the taxing
state and other states would be attributed to the several states in-
volved by applying the apportionment formula.31
Although all three attribution formulas are used, the apportion-
ment method is clearly the most popular 32 and is currently the subject
of immense activity in the courts, legislatures, corporate boardrooms,
and Congress. 33 The means of apportioning interstate income to the
appropriate taxing authority is the crucial issue in the debate over the
legitimacy of unitary taxation. As a result, the subject of unitary taxa-
tion deals almost exclusively with the various means of income appor-
tionment and not the alternative methods of attribution.34 A review
of the statutory and judicial developments in this area reveals the ex-
tent of the debate over unitary taxation.
B. Statutory Developments
Beginning in the early 1960's, several significant statutory develop-
ments concerning state taxation of multijurisdictional corporations oc-
curred in Congress and in most of the state legislatures. A brief
review of these developments assists in placing the present status of
apportionment taxation into perspective. 3
29. Comment, Formulating Apportionment supra note 19, at 721.
30. Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 23, at 116.
31. Comment, Formulating Apportionmen4 supra note 19, at 721-22.
32. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
33. See Hellerstein, State Income Taxation, supra note 23, at 113-16.
34. The issues involved in the Kellogg Company case dealt primarily with the inter-
pretation of Nebraska's apportionment formula and whether the apportionment
statutes even apply-i.e., whether the income of a corporation is such that other
means of attribution would not apply. Therefore, when analyzing Nebraska's
method of taxing multijurisdictional corporations, this paper focuses on the ap-
portionment aspects, and secondly on the determination of whether the busi-
nesses are unitary. See infra notes 142-64 and accompanying text.
35. Several sources describe the statutory developments of apportionment in state
taxation. See infra notes 38, 43, 66 & 78. Therefore, this paper only outlines a
brief description of the statutory development.
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1. Public Law 86-272
In 1959, the United States Supreme Court, in two separate cases,
upheld a state tax on sales activity within the taxing state of an out-of-
state corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce within
the taxing state.36 Seven months after the judicial opinions,37 Con-
gress responded by enacting Public Law 86-272,38 establishing mini-
mum standards for state imposition of an income tax on interstate
commerce.
39
The general thrust of Public Law 86-272 is to prohibit state or local
36. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452-65
(1959); Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Stock-
ham Valves was decided together with Northwestern States Portland Cement
Company. The issue was whether a state could constitutionally levy a state in-
come tax on that portion of an out-of-state corporation's net income earned from
business activities exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce. The
Supreme Court upheld the tax over both commerce and due process clause
objections.
37. The speed shown by Congress in reacting to the Supreme Court decisions has
been a focus of comment. See, e.g., Celler, The Development of a Congressional
Program Dealing with State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 36 FORDHAM L.
REV. 385, 387 (1968); Roland, PUBLIC LAW 86-272: Regulation or Raid, 46 VA. L.
REV. 1172, 1174-75 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Roland, Regulation or Raid]. In
fact, the urgency displayed in passing Public Law 86-272 prompted one commen-
tator to write that Public Law 86-272 "was a hasty, hysteria legislation, if you will,
pressured through the Federal Congress by a highly organized and certainly skill-
fully handled group of trade organizations." Roland, State Taxation of Interstate
Income: A State Tax Administrator's Viewpoint, 12 TAx EXECUTIVE 35, 35 (1959).
The primary cause of the haste was the enormous pressure directed on Con-
gress by businesses engaged in interstate commerce. One article quoted the
chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business as stating: "If the
volume of mail committee members receive is a true index, small businessmen
are as concerned over the recent opinions of the Supreme Court on State taxation
of interstate business income as almost any other problem they have faced since
the committee was established in 1950." Hirshberg & Nedry, A Federal Concept
of Doing Business, 46 VA. L. REV. 1241, 1243-44 (1960). The major justifications
for the positioi taken by interstate businesses included: (1) the widespread con-
cern about the cost of complying with the various nonuniform tax laws; (2) the
fear that more than 100 percent of a corporation's income could be taxed; and
(3) the impediment to the free flow of commerce among the states. See Roland,
Regulation or Raid, supra, at 1176-78.
38. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1976)). For
further discussion of Public Law 86-272, see Celler, supra note 37, at 385; Hart-
man, "Solicitation" and "Delivery" Under Public Law 86-272: An Unchartered
Course, 29 VAND. L. REV. 353 (1976); Hirshberg & Nedry, supra note 37, at 1241;
Roland, Regulation or Raid, supra note 37, at 1172.
39. The relevant provisions of Public Law 86-272 read as follows:
(a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose,
for any taxable year ending after [September 14, 1959,] a net income tax
on the income derived within such State by any person from interstate
commerce if the only business activities within such State by or on be-




governments from imposing net income taxes on sellers of tangible
personal property whose business activities are limited to the follow-
ing activities: (1) the solicitation of orders by the seller or his personal
representative outside the taxing state when the orders are sent
outside the taxing state and are filled by shipment or delivery from a
point outside the state; or (2) the solicitation of orders outside the tax-
ing state by the seller or his personal representative when the orders
are sent out of the taxing state for acceptance and are filled from a
point outside the taxing state.40 The main impact of Public Law 86-272
appears to be that income derived from regular and systematic solici-
tation is not subject to state taxation.41
Congressional committees were directed by Public Law 86-272 to
examine legislation dealing with state taxation of multijurisdictional
corporations, but as of yet no proposals have ever been adopted.
42
2. Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
About the time that Congress was in the process of approving Pub-
lic Law 86-272, the states were preparing a uniform approach to the
taxation of multijurisdictional corporations. In 1957, the Uniform Di-
vision of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA)43 was approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in
such State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are
sent outside the State for approval or reflection, and, if approved, are
filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in
such State in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer
of such person, if orders by such customer to such person to enable
such customer to fill orders resulting from such solicitaion are orders
described in paragraph (1).
15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1982).
40. Hartman, supra note 38, at 353-54.
41. See Roland, Regulation or Raid, supra note 37, at 1181. As a result of Public Law
86-272, states are not able to tax the income of out-of-state sellers of tangible
personal property if the seller's only intrastate activity is (1) soliciting orders to
be approved from outside the state, and (2) filling the solicited orders by delivery
from outside the state. See Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note
19, at 736.
42. See Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note 19, at 737. However,
Public Law 86-272 has been supplemented four times. See Parnell, Constitutional
Considerations of Federal Control Over the Sovereign Taxing Authority of the
States, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 227, 227 n.4 (1979).
43. 7A U.L.A. 91 (1978). UDITPA is also reproduced as part of the Multistate Tax
Compact in 1 ST. TAx GUIDE (CCH) 351 (1982) and 1 ST. & Loc. TAX SERV. (P-
H) q 6310-63 (1975). For an overall discussion of the UDITPA, see Hellerstein,
Construing the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act: Reflections on
the Illinois Supreme Court's Reading of the "Throwback"Rule, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
768 (1978); Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act Re-ex-
amined, 46 VA. L. REv. 1257 (1960) [hereinafter cited as UDITPA Re-examined];
Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 41
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and the American Bar Association and has since been adopted by
twenty-three states.44 The UDITPA was designed to assure uniform
apportionment of interstate income with the goals of decreasing
double taxation and increasing taxpayer compliance.45 While attempt-
ing to decrease the risk of double taxation, the UDITPA's uniform
principles of allocation and apportionment of interstate income were
designed to ensure that 100 percent of a corporation's unitary income
was taxable by the states.46
Since Nebraska's original income tax on multijurisdictional corpo-
rations is based on the UDITPA, the basic mechanics of the apportion-
ment are instructive on how Nebraska's statutes operate. The
UDITPA requires that nonbusiness income47 be specifically allocated
to the taxing state,48 while business income49 is apportioned to the tax-
ing state.5 0 The apportionment requires that all business income be
multiplied by a fraction that apportions to the taxing state a portion of
the corporation's business income equal to the average of three ra-
tios:51 the ratio of the corporation's in-state property to its total prop-
erty,52 of its in-state payroll to its total payroll,53 and of its in-state
(1958); Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax Purposes, 35 TAXES
747 (1957).
44. Those states that have adopted UDITPA in substantial part include: Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington. In addi-
tion, the District of Columbia has also adopted the UDITPA. 1 ST. TAX. GUIDE
(CCH) 10-000, at 1043 (1984).
45. See Lynn, Formula Apportionment of Corporate Income for State Tax Purposes:
Natura Non Facit Saltum, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 84, 87 (1957).
46. See Hellerstein, supra note 43, at 769.
47- UDITPA § 1(e) (1957) (" 'Non-business income' means all income other than
business income.").
48. UDITPA § 4 (1957)("[T]o the extent that [rents and royalties from real or tangi-
ble personal property, capital gains, interest, dividends, or patents or copyright
royalties] constitute non-business income, [they] shall be allocated as provided in
Sections 5 through 8 of this Act.").
49. UDITPA § 1(a) (1957)(" 'Business income' means income arising from transac-
tions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business.").
50. UDITPA § 9 (1957). There appears to be a trend away from the "business" versus
"nonbusiness" distinction. Several states refuse to use separate accounting for
nonbusiness income and apply the apportionment formula to all corporate in-
come not earned solely in the taxing state. See Harris, State Taxation of Income
Earned Beyond Its Borders. Allocation and Apportionment of Unitary Business
Income in Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 21, 39 (1980). For a discussion of this
trend, see Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note 19, at 737-38, n.98.
See also supra note 40.
51. UDITPA § 9 (1957). See infra note 55.
52. UDITPA § 10 (1957) ("The property is a fraction, the numerator of which is the
average value of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or
rented and used in this state during the tax period, and the denominator of which
is the average value of all the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property
[Vol. 64:135
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sales receipts5 4 to its total sales receipts.95 The UDITPA also provides
for alternative methods to be used if the allocation and apportionment
provisions fail to "fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's busi-
ness activity in the taxing state."5 6
In applying the income attribution mechanisms, the UDITPA
makes two significant assumptions. First, the UDITPA assumes that
the state has the necessary jurisdiction to levy the tax.57 Second, the
owned or rented and used during the tax period."). See also NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 77-2744 (1981).
53. UDITPA § 13 (1957) ("The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is
the total amount paid in this state during the tax period by the taxpayer for com-
pensation, and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid every-
where during the tax period."). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2747 (1981).
54. UDITPA § 15 (1957)("The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the
total sales of the taxpayer in this state during the tax period, and the denomina-
tor of which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax period.").
See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2749 (1981).
55. See generally Hellerstein, supra note 43, at 771. The fraction consists of "the nu-
merator . . . which is the property factor plus the payroll factor plus the sales
factor, and the denominator . . . which is three." UDITPA § 9 (1957). The
UDITPA's mathematical apportionment equation is as follows:
Property Owned Payroll Paid Sales in
Taxable _ Business X in Taxing State + in Taxing State + Taxing State
Income Income Total Property Total Payroll Total Sales
Owned Paid
3
An example of the operation of the three-factor formula is:
If a corporation's net income were $100 and the total amounts of its prop-
erty, payroll, and sales were $100 each and the amounts of each of those
factors located in the taxing state were 5, 15 and 20 respectively, the
amount of income taxable . . . [u]nder the three factor system (5/100 +
15/100 + 20/100)/3 X $100, or only $13, would be taxable.
Comment, Apportionment of Corporate Income to the States for Tax Purposes:
Fifty Ways to Lose Your Tax Dollar, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 480, 482 n.11 (1978).
Traditional economic theory would suggest that income results from a combi-
nation of labor and property to produce a good which is sold to consumers. The
UDITPA agrees with this theory to the extent that the apportionment formula
uses a property and payroll factor. Some commentators argue strongly that the
apportionment formula should only be based on these two factors. See Studenski,
The Need for Federal Curbs on State Taxes on Interstate Commerce: An Econo-
mist's Viewpoin4 46 VA. L. REv. 1121, 1146-48 (1960). However, the UDITPA
includes the sales factor in an attempt to balance the revenue needs of both the
producer and consumer states. "It should be noted that the 'producer' state is
also a 'market' state. Thus, apportionment theory came to include sales as a
means of balancing claims of market states vis-a-vis industrial states." UDITPA
Re-examined, supra note 43, at 1262.
56. UDITPA § 18 (1957) (If the allocation and apportionment provisions do not fairly
represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in the state, the taxpayer
may petition for a separate accounting, the exclusion of a factor, or the inclusion
of an additional factor, or any other method that will effect an equitable
apportionment.).
57. Therefore, the issue of whether a state tax is proper under the commerce and due
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UDITPA assumes that the state has defined the taxable basis so that
the only remaining problem is attributing the taxable base to the tax-
ing state.5 8 Initially, only a few states adopted UDITPA,59 but once
the UDITPA was incorporated into the 1967 Multistate Tax Com-
pact,60 several more states enacted the Act in their tax apportionment
schemes.61
3. Multistate Tax Compact
In 1964, a congressional subcommittee published a study on state
taxation of interstate business commonly known as the Willis Re-
port.62 The Willis Report expressed the view that the various state
apportionment schemes then being used increased business cost and
disrespect for the laws, required additional paperwork, and fostered
possible haphazard taxation.63 The Report proposed that such
problems could be lessened by adopting a federal allocation plan using
a two-factor formula.64 The threats of federal intervention in the field
of state taxation of multijurisdictional corporations caused by the Wil-
lis Report prompted the states to draft the Multistate Tax Compact.65
The Multistate Tax Compact was drafted in 1966 by a special com-
mittee of the Council of State Governments as an alternative to pro-
posed interstate taxation bills pending in Congress.6 6 The Compact
became effective on August 4, 1967, and to date nineteen states and the
District of Columbia have become members.6 7
process clauses has already been determined. See infra notes 10141 and accom-
panying text (discusses the relevant constitutional and judicial limitations).
58. See Pierce, supra note 43, at 747. "The proposal does not provide for the tax base;
it merely provides for an equitable means of apportioning and allocating the in-
come to individual states when the taxpayer is engaged in business in more than
one state." Id. at 748.
59. 7A U.L.A. 91 (1978).
60. See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
61. See Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note 19, 739.
62. WILLIs REPORT, supra note 4, pts. 1 & 2 (1964).
63. Id. at 583-88.
64. See Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note 19, at 739. The Willis
Committee argued to eliminate the sales factor because of the expense and diffi-
culties of compliance and administration.
65. For the full text of the Multistate Tax Compact, see 1 ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) ' 351
(1982); 1 ST. & Loc. TAx SERV. (P-H) 6310-48 (1975); Note, The Constitutional-
ity of the Multistate Compact, 29 VAND. L. REV. 453, 470 app. (1976).
66. For articles discussing the Multistate Tax Compact, see Hellerstein, State Taxa-
tion of Interstate Business, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335, 341 (1976); Peters, An Analysis
of Important Recent Developments in the State and Local Tax Area, 39 J. TAX'N
172, 176 (1973).
67. Nebraska became a member in 1967. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2901 (1981). As of
1984, the following states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Compact:
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. The following states are associate
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The primary purpose of the Multistate Tax Compact has been
stated as follows:
The basic justification of the Multistate Compact is that the States them-
selves are the most appropriate instruments for the determination of their
own tax laws and policies. The Compact is a means by which the States can
cooperatively work out any problems which may exist, or which may arise in
the future, because businesses function in more than one State. Further, the
record of activity in Congress over the past few years appears to make it likely
that if the States do not take cooperative action to deal with the problems
alleged to exist, Federal legislation restricting the jurisdiction of the States
and their local governments to tax will ensue.
6 8
The effect of the Compact has been to devise a format for resolving
tax disputes between differing states6 9 while also providing for uni-
form taxation methods.
Member states may continue their own scheme for taxing multiju-
risdictional corporations, or they may use the suggested apportion-
ment methods contained in the Compact.70 The Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act was incorporated in article IV of the
Multistate Tax Compact.7 1 Article IV provides for apportionment of a
corporation's income so long as the corporation can show that another
state could tax a portion of that income.7 2 States adopting the Multi-
members of the Compact: Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Ten-
nessee. See 1 ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) 351, at 356 (1984). Those states that have
not adopted the Compact in full are associate members and are allowed to partici-
pate in meetings of the Commission but are not allowed to vote. See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 77-2901, art. VI (1981).
68. Comment, supra note 19, at 740-41 quoting 23 COMMITTEE OF STATE OFFICIALS ON
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTs, SUGGESTED
STATE LEGISLATION C-3 to C-4 (1968). Article one of the Multistate Compact out-
lines the objectives as follows:
1. Facilitate proper determination of state and local tax liability of mul-
tistate taxpayers, including the equitable apportionment of tax bases and
settlement of apportionment disputes;
2. Promote uniformity or compatibility in significant components of tax
systems;
3. Facilitate taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing of tax
returns and in other phases of tax administration; and
4. Avoid duplicative taxation.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2901, art. 1 (1981).
69. The Multistate Tax Compact was held to be constitutional in United States Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 479 (1978). The taxpayers claimed
that the Multistate Compact violated the compact clause of the Constitution since
Congress had never endorsed it. The Supreme Court held that the Compact was
constitutional since it did not further the political power of member states in such
a way as to encroach on the supremacy of the United States. Id at 472-78.
70. See Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note 19, at 741.
71. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2901, art. IV (1981). The Compact's adoption of the
UDITPA includes the three-factor apportionment formula.




state Tax Compact are able to retain their existing provisions for ap-
portioning interstate income;73 however, any taxpayer subject to a
state's apportionment tax may require that state to apply the Com-
pact's apportionment formula.7 4
4. Present Statutory Status
a. States
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia tax corporate income
in some manner.75 Even with the presence of the Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act 76 and the Multistate Tax Compact,77
great variety exists in state corporate income tax schemes.7 8
The formula methods used to attribute the taxable income to the
taxing state varies among states. Nearly all of the corporate income
taxing states allow some use of specific allocation79 and separate ac-
counting8 0 to attribute income to the taxing state in certain circum-
stances. However, some form of an apportionment formula is used by
all of the states,8 1 but each state applies the formula differently.
Diversification of apportionment taxation primarily involves three
areas: (1) the tax base to which the formula is applied, (2) the specific
factors included in the apportionment formula, and (3) the extent to
which the factors apply.
The tax base is the most widely varying factor in apportionment
taxation. The majority of states levying an income tax on multijuris-
dictional corporations use a corporation's federal taxable income as
73. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2901, art. III (1981).
74. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2901, art. IV, § 2 (1981). Obviously, this provision would
not overtly affect a Nebraska taxpayer since Nebraska has generally adopted the
apportionment formula of the UDITPA. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2735 to -52
(1981).
75. Only Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming do not have some form of a cor-
porate income tax. See 1 ST. & Loc. TAX SERV. (P-H) 101 (1982). In South
Dakota, only banks pay a corporate income tax. 1 ST. & Loc. TAX SERV. (P-H)
101 (1982).
76. To date, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia follow the UDITPA.
See supra note 44.
77. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Multistate Tax
Compact. See supra note 67.
78. See generally 1 ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) 10-000, 1042-44 (1984); 1 ST. & Loc. TAX
SERV. (P-H) 1046 (1984); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, KEY ISSUES AFFECTING
STATE TAXATION OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CORPORATE INCOME NEED REVISING 9
(1982) (reprinted in 26 TAX NOTES Microfiche Data Base Doc. 82-7158 (July 12,
1982)) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
79. Only Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island do not use specific alloca-
tion. 1 ST. & Loc. TAX SERV. (P-H) 1046 (1984).
80. Only New Hampshire and New Jersey do not allow separate accounting. 1 ST. &




the beginning tax base.82 Even though the majority of states begin
with a similar base, each state adjusts the base to account for special
interests. Several states use a corporation's total income earned
worldwide as the tax base for apportionment.83
All of the states taxing corporate income allow some type of appor-
tionment.8 4 However, the specific apportionment methods utilized by
the states are not totally uniform. Forty-two states use the three-fac-
tor formula, consisting of property, payroll, and sales factors.8 5 Six of
those states using the three-factor formula do not give equal weight to
the three factors.86 Also, thirty-nine states have additional factors to
be implemented in specific situations.8 7
Even though most of the states using apportionment taxation of
multijurisdictional corporations use the three-factor formula, the ex-
tent to which each of the factors is applied differs among states. The
factors may include a corporation's property, payroll, and sales on a
domestic or a worldwide basis. Twelve states have adopted a total
82. Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia use the corporation's federal taxa-
ble income as the beginning tax base. Those states include: Alaska, Arizona, Col-
orado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan (other
nonfederal components are also used in the tax base), Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Hamphsire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. 1 ST. & Loc. TAX GUIDE (CCH) 110,000, at
1043 (1984).
83. See generally 1 ST. TAx GUIDE (CCH) 10-200 to -942 (1984). The states using
federal taxable income as the beginning tax base then make adjustments accord-
ing to state law to arrive at the state taxable income. The other states generally
require a corporation to start with its gross income and then to deduct specific
items. See GAO REPORT, supra note 78, at 13.
84. See ST. & Loc. TAx. SERV. (P-H) 1046 (1984).
85. Of the forty-six corporate income taxing states, only Colorado, Iowa, Missouri,
and West Virginia use some other apportionment method than the three-factor
formula. Colorado and West Virginia use a two-factor apportionment formula.
Colorado's formula implements a property and sales factor in the formula while
West Virgina utilizes a property and payroll factor in the formula. Iowa and Mis-
souri uses only a single- factor apportionment formula. Both formulas are based
on a corporation's sales factor. 1 ST. & Loc. TAx. SERV. (P-H) 1046 (1984).
86. Those states applying the three factors unequally include: Connecticut (sales fac-
tor used twice and is the sole factor for businesses other than manufacturing and
sale of tangibles); Florida (property factor is 25 percent, sales factor is 50 percent,
and payroll factor is 25 percent); Massachusetts (sales factor used twice); Missis-
sippi (sales factor is the sole factor for retailing, renting, servicing, and mer-
chandizing); New York (sales factor used twice); Oklahoma (payroll factor
excludes compensation as a general of administrative expense); and Wisconsin
(property factor is 25 percent, sales factor is 50 1iercent, payroll factor is 25 per-
cent, and payroll factor replaces cost factor). 1 ST. & Loc. TAx. SERV. (P-H)
1 1046 (1984).
87. Colorado, Indiana, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Rhode Island and Utah do not
have "special circumstances" formulas. 1 ST. & Loc. TAX. SERV. (P-H) 1046
(1984).
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worldwide approach, including the earned income of foreign subsidiar-
ies in the tax base and using the worldwide values of the unitary
group's property, payroll, and sales to compute the apportionment fac-
tor.88 Because of the subtle distinctions in the tax base and apportion-
ment factors, it is difficult to determine if the remaining states use
domestic values to compute the apportionment factor.
The diversity in apportionment formulas used by states also makes
it difficult to accurately categorize the taxing schemes of individual
states into particular patterns. This diversity discredits attempts to
apply broad labels to describe specific taxing methods.8 9 Despite the
subtle distinctions in apportionment taxation, several generally de-
fined apportionment formulas exemplify the various combinations
used by the states.90
The general mechanics of the apportionment method of taxation,
found in the UDITPA,91 are illustrated as follows:
Property Owned Payroll Paid Sales in
Taxable Business in Taxing State in Taxing State Taxing State
Income - Income Total Property Total Payroll Total Sales
Owned Paid
3
Based on the above formula, states may utilize any number of general
apportionment options to achieve the desired fiscal balance. One op-
tion is to use a corporation's worldwide income as the tax base and its
worldwide values of property, payroll, and sales to compute the appor-
tionment factor.92 Closely related to the worldwide approach is the
88. See infra note 92.
89. Examples of labels used to describe taxing schemes include the Massachusetts
formula, the Detroit formula, waters edge, and unitary taxation. Unitary taxa-
tion is a prime example of the distortion that occurs by using labels in this field of
diversification. Unitary taxation describes the taxing of corporations doing busi-
ness in several taxing jurisdictions. See supra note 4. However, the term is fre-
quently construed to refer to total worldwide apportionment. The confusion
surrounding the term "unitary taxation" is largely a result of the failure to un-
derstand that unitary taxation only describes the process of taxing certain corpo-
rate activities and not a particular means of taxing unitary businesses. See infra
notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
90. The examples discussed in this section do not consider the many adjustments
made to the base and the separate terms.
91. See supra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
92. This option may be illustrated as follows:
Taxable Total Net Income Property, Payroll & Sales in Taxing State
Income Worldwide Property, Payroll & Sales Worldwide
For an example using the total worldwide approach, see infra note 262 and ac-
companying text.
To date, twelve states have adopted this basic formula. Those states include:
Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah. See Weissman, supra note 10,
at 48. This number may rise as a result of Container Corp. of America v.
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domestic approach. In this latter option, a state applies a factor con-
sisting of a corporation's property, payroll, and sales within the United
States to a tax base consisting of the corporation's domestic income.93
Other options may result in a hybrid of the domestic and worldwide
elements. For example, a corporation's worldwide property, payroll,
and sales may be applied to its domestic income. 94
Although little uniformity actually exists between states in apply-
ing a unitary tax, there is a degree of "internal" uniformity that exists
within the formula of each particular state. Generally, states use a
total domestic or total worldwide method of unitary taxation, thereby
matching foreign income with foreign apportionment values and do-
mestic income with domestic apportionment values. 95 The basic con-
stitutional requirement of reasonable attribution would seem to
dictate this matching. The internal uniformity that results by adopt-
ing a pure formula avoids the inequitable attribution that would result
by adopting a hybrid combination.
b. Federal
As was noted earlier, except for Public Law 86-272, there has been
a general lack of federal intervention in the area of state taxation of
multijurisdictional corporations. 96 However, several factors are re-
Franchise Tax Board, 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), which validates California's world-
wide unitary tax. See id. at 49.
93. This option may be illustrated as follows:
Taxable Total Federal Property, Payroll & Sales in Taxing State
Income = Taxable/Domestic X PIncome Property, Payroll & Sales Within U.S.
An example using this domestic formula is found in note 263 and accompanying
text.
94. This formula involves basing the factor on a corporation's worldwide property,
payroll, and sales. The factor is then applied to the corporation's domestic in-
come as follows:
Taxable Total Federal Property, Payroll & Sales in Taxing State
Income = Taxable/Domestic XIncome Property, Payroll & Sales Worldwide
For an application of this formula, see infra note 264 and accompanying text.
A second combination option, also involving a hybrid approach, is to apply a
domestic apportionment formula to a corporation's total worldwide income. This
option is illustrated as follows:
Taxable Total Net Income Property, Payroll & Sales in Taxing State
Income = Worldwide X Property, Payroll & Sales Within U.S.
No states could be found that have adopted such a formula, and it is probable that
the formula would not pass constitutional scrutiny.
95. See supra notes 92-93.
96. See supra text accompanying note 42. This lack of congressional response is not
without judicial invitation. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
103 S. Ct. 2933, 2955-56 (1983); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,280 (1978).
For an excellent summary of federal involvement with unitary taxation, see
BNA, THE RECENT CONTROVERSY OVER WORLDWIDE UNITARY TAXATION (1984).
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sulting in a new surge of federal activity both in Congress and in the
Executive Branch.
Bills have been introduced in both the Senate97 and House of Rep-
resentatives 9s to clarify the extent to which a state may tax certain
income from sources outside of the United States.99 The gist of the
proposed federal legislation is to limit the states' ability to tax any in-
come derived from foreign sources.100 The Executive Branch has also
been actively reviewing the status of state taxation of multijurisdic-
tional corporations.
C. Judicial Developments
Until the enactment of Public Law 86-272, limitations on a state's
power to tax multijurisdictional corporations were found only in the
states' statutes and constitutions as interpreted by the courts. Because
of the limited involvement of Congress, the courts have remained the
primary source of law governing the power of the states to tax mul-
tijurisdictional corporations. Essentially, the courts have been con-
cerned with determining: (1) whether the taxing statutes violate the
United States Constitution, and (2) whether the taxing statutes actu-
ally provide for the particular taxing activity through a process of stat-
utory interpretation. In discussing the judicial development in the
area of general state taxation of multijurisdictional corporations, this
Article focuses on the constitutional limits on the states' taxing power.
1. Authority to Tax
In 1819, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the United States
Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland,101 stated:
97. S. 1225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7518 (1983)(introduced by Senator Mathias on May
5, 1983).
98. H.R. 2918, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983)(introduced by Representative Conable on
May 5, 1983).
99. A copy of both bills can be found in 1 ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) 377-78 (1983).
100. Specifically, the relevant portion of the legislation reads as follows:
(a) In General.-Where two or more corporations are members of the
same affiliated group of corporations-
(1) for purposes of imposing an income tax on any corporation which
is a member of such group, no State, or political subdivision thereof,
may take into account, or include in income subject to such tax, any
amount of income of, or attributable to,
(2) any other corporation which is a member of such group and which
is a foreign corporation,
unless such amount is includable in the gross income of the corporation
described in paragraph (1) for purposes of chapter 1 (including any
amount includable in gross income under subpart F of part III of sub-
chapter N of chapter 1) for the taxable year in which or with which the
taxable period (for purposes of State or local law) ends.
S. 1225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7518(a) (1983).
101. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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[The) power of taxation is one of vital importance; that it is retained by the
states; that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the govern-
ment of the Union; that it is to be concurrently exercised by the two govern-
ments-are truths which never have been denied.1 0 2
While the Court in McCulloch recognized the states' sovereign power
to tax,103 states are constitutionally limited in their ability to tax by
the principle that a state may not tax property unconnected with the
state.10 4 This constitutional limitation becomes significant when a
state taxes interstate income earned by a multijurisdictional corpora-
tion because, in attempting to tax a fair portion of the interstate in-
come, the taxing state may seek to include income actually earned
outside of the state. 05 The constitutional requirement that income
subject to taxation must be reasonably attributed to the taxing state 06
has largely rested on the limitations imposed by the commerce and
due process clauses of the United States Constitution. 0 7 Therefore,
the effectiveness and validity of the diverse state corporate income tax
statutes depend upon their being in compliance with the minimum
limits placed upon such laws by the Constitution.108
Compliance with the Constitution is much more difficult than it
would appear. Although there are few clear constitutional limitations
on a state's power to tax multijurisdictional corporations, the case-by-
case approach adopted by the Supreme Court has resulted in confu-
sion.' 0 9 A brief description of the relevant constitutional concerns
102. Id. at 425.
103. Id at 429. Justice Marshall wrote: "All subjects over which the sovereign power
of a state extends, are objects of taxation but those over which it does not extend,
are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation." Id.
104. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1968). The
Court stated: "[Tihe taxation of property not located in the taxing State is consti-
tutionally invalid, both because it imposes an illegitimate restraint on interstate
commerce and because it denies to the taxpayer the process that is his due." Id.
at 325. See also Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920).
105. See Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note 19, at 722.
106. See Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920). See also supra note 7.
107. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968).
108. Apportionment formulas were adopted by states in an effort to reasonably appor-
tion income of multijurisdictional corporations to the taxing state. The theory is
that the formula, while applying to all of a corporation's income, does not tax
income attributed to activities outside the taxing state.
109. See Comment, FormulatingApportionment, supra note 19, at 723. In Northwest-
ern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959), Justice
Clark, writing for the majority, stated:
Commerce between the States having grown up like Topsy, the Congress
meanwhile not having undertaken the regulation of it, and the States
having understandably persisted in their efforts to get some return for
the substantial benefits they have afforded it, there is little wonder that
there has been no end of cases testing out state tax levies. The resulting
judicial application of constitutional principles to specific state statutes
leaves much room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of
precise guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensible power
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provides some basis by which to test the validity of Nebraska's taxing
scheme.
2. Commerce Clause
The United States Supreme Court has held that the commerce
clausei10 grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce
and prohibits the states from imposing direct restrictions on interstate
commerce. 1 1 The commerce clause also limits state laws that may
directly restrict interstate commerce even if Congress has not acted.112
Although the Supreme Court initially held that the commerce
clause prohibited direct state taxation of wholly interstate com-
merce,113 the Court shifted its approach to state taxation and required
that interstate businesses pay their fair share of the state tax bur-
den..4 In 1959, the Court held that the commerce clause does not pre-
clude a state from levying a fairly apportioned net income tax on a
foreign corporation that conducts only interstate activity."15
of taxation. This Court alone has handed down some three hundred full-
dress opinions ... [not all of which have been] "consistent or
reconcilable."
Id.
110. "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 8, cl. 3.
111. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). For a discussion of state taxation of
multijurisdictional corporations and the commerce clause, see Hellerstein, supra
note 66, at 337 (1976); Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note 19, at
723-25.
112. See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
458 (1959); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320-21 (1851). The
judicial regulation through the silences of Congress is commonly referred to as
negative implications of the commerce clause. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 320 (1978). See generally Sholley, The Negative Implications of
the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1936).
113. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320-21 (1851); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 8 (1824).
114. See, e.g., Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Co.'s, 435
U.S. 734, 750 (1978); International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322
U.S. 340, 348 (1944); Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254-58
(1938); William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1918).
115. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). The
Court noted a distinction between a permissible tax on net income from inter-
state commerce and an impermissible tax on the privilege of engaging in inter-
state commerce. See id. at 461. The dicta in Northwestern States Portland
Cement Company repeated the rule originally stated in Spector Motor Service,
Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). In Spector Motor Service, Inc., the Court
held that a income tax is a tax on business done within the state and is permissi-
ble. An franchise tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce violates
the commerce clause.
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court repudi-
ated the distinction between income and franchise taxes. Recent Nebraska legis-
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Recently, the Supreme Court has tried to clarify the factors by
which to judge the constitutionality of a state law under the commerce
clause.116 The Court has established the following four standards by
which to determine whether the tax law is valid under the commerce
clause: (1) the tax must be applied to an activity that has a substantial
nexus with the taxing state; (2) the tax must be fairly apportioned;
(3) the tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce; and
(4) the tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the
state.17
3. Due Process Clause
The due process clause,118 as applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment,119 has been used to attack state taxation of mul-
tijurisdictional corporations. The essence of the due process challenge
is that a state is not able to tax income earned outside its borders.
However, the due process clause does not preclude a state from look-
ing beyond its borders to obtain the correct value of property or in-
come within the state "when the out-of-state property and income are
an integral part of an interstate system that enhances the value of the
property or income that is taxed." 2 0
The Supreme Court recently defined the test to be applied in order
to determine whether a state's apportionment formula was consistent
with the due process clause.' 2 ' The established test requires there to
be: (1) "a rational relationship between the income attributed to the
state and the interstate values of the enterprise,"' 22 and (2) "a 'mini-
mal connection' between the interstate activities and the taxing
lation seeks to amend the original corporate income tax and franchise taxes. See
infra note 281 and accompanying text.
116. Relevant recent cases include Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447
U.S. 207 (1980); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Department of Revenue v. Associ-
ation of Wash. Stevedoring Co.'s., 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
117. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228 (1980); Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1979); Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). See also Comment, Formulating
Apportionmen4 supra note 19, at 725. When the tax affects foreign commerce,
additional standards must be met. See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
119. No state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
120. See Comment, Formulating Apportionmen supra note 19, at 726. The analysis
requires appropriate factors be established to bring income of a corporation
within a state's taxing jurisdiction. See i&l In 1920, the Supreme Court held in
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920), that the appor-
tionment method of attributing income to the taxing state was constitutional
since the method only reached that income earned in the state. See idi at 120.
121. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
122. Id at 436-37 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978)).
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state."123 Therefore, the amount of income taxed cannot be arbitrary,
and a nexus of activity must be present before a state can tax inter-
state income consistent with the due process standards.124 The tests
under the due process and commerce clauses are quite similar. The
Supreme Court has noted the similarity in the requirements, com-
menting that, generally, the activities meeting the due process stan-
dards will also satisfy the requirements of the commerce clause.125
The taxpayer has the burden of showing that the due process re-
quirements were not satisfied. To show that the state failed to meet
the first standard, the rational relationship requirement, a taxpayer
must establish "by 'clear and cogent evidence' that the income attrib-
uted to the State is in fact 'out of all appropriate proportions to the
business transacted in that State .. '. ,"'126 The stringent burden of
proof placed upon the taxpayer to rebut the presumptive stature of a
state's apportionment formula is a barrier to successfully challenging
a state's method of taxation. The burden on the taxpayer is increased
since states are not required to obtain mathematical precision in the
apportionment schemes. 127
It is not completely clear how substantial a nexus must exist before
the second due process requirement is satisfied. The Supreme Court
has held that a nexus exists "if the corporation 'avails itself of the
"substantial privilege of carrying on business" within the State
.... "'128 However, recent Supreme Court decisions129 have sug-
gested "that the unitary business principle, which requires a showing
that a business's interstate operations are interdependent, supplies the
requisite nexus between the state and the corporation's interstate in-
come even when the corporation conducts some facet of its business
entirely outside the taxing state."1 30
4. Foreign Commerce Clause
When a state attempts to tax the income of a corporation that is
123. Id.
124. See Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note 19, at 726.
125. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2940, 2942-43
(1983). But see ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 3103, 3117
(1982)(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1061-65 (1960) (commerce
clause and due process requirements differ in many contexts).
126. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2942, (1983) (quoting
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978)).
127. Id. at 2949-50. See also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978).
128. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220 (1980) (quoting
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980).
129. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 225 (1980); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner, 445 U.S. 425, 439-40 (1980).
130. See Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note 19, at 727. See infra
notes 142-64 and accompanying text.
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engaged in international commerce as well as interstate commerce,
the foreign commerce clause is applicable.13' The effect of involving
international commerce in the tax scheme is to subject the taxing stat-
utes to stricter scrutiny than that applied to the statutes providing for
the taxation of interstate commerce. 32 Those stricter standards, de-
tailed by the United States Supreme Court in Container Corporation
of America, require the following determinations: (1) whether the tax
creates an enhanced risk of multiple taxation, or (2) whether the tax
impairs federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is
essential. 33
Although a slight overlapping of tax may be acceptable in domestic
taxation, double taxation assunmes greater importance when the tax
involves international income. However, the acceptability of limited
double taxation depends upon the context in which it occurs and the
available alternatives.134 In the context of foreign taxation, signifi-
cantly varying taxing schemes have evolved even though most nations
have adopted some version of the arm's-length approach. 35 As a re-
sult of this variance among foreign tax schemes, even if a state would
adopt the arm's-length approach, double taxation could not be elimi-
nated.136 Therefore, if a state's taxing scheme does not inevitably lead
to double taxation, the foreign commerce clause does not require the
state to adopt the tax scheme commonly used by the foreign taxing
jurisdiction.13 7
131. "The Congress shall have Power... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations
.... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a discussion of the foreign commerce
clause in the area of state taxation of multijurisdictional corporations, see Note,
State Taxation of Multinational Corporations and the Apportionment of World-
wide Income, 63 NEB. L. REV. 631 (1984).
132. Compare Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2950
(1983)(California's income tax did not violate the foreign commerce clause), with
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979)(California's
property tax on cargo ships did violate the foreign commerce clause).
133. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2951 (1983).
134. See id. at 2953. It should be noted that California's tax did result in actual double
taxation, that the double taxation did result from divergent taxing schemes be-
tween the state and foreign governments, that the foreign taxing schemes were
consistent with the international practice, and that the United States prefers the
foreign taxing scheme over California's method.
135. Under the arm's-length approach, every corporation is generally treated as if it
were an independent entity at arm's-length with its affiliated corporations.
These corporations are then only taxed by the jurisdictions in which they operate
and only for the income they realize on their own books. Id. at 2950.
136. Id at 2954.
137. See id at 2954-55. The Container Court stated:
It could be argued that even if the Foreign Commerce Clause does
not require California to adopt the arm's-length approach to foreign sub-
sidiaries of domestic corporations, it does require that whatever system
of taxation California adopts must not result in double taxation in any
particular case. The implication of such a rule, however, would be that
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Determining whether a particular state tax impairs the necessary
federal uniformity requires an analysis of whether the state tax
scheme: (1) "implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the
Federal Government," or (2) "violates a clear federal directive."13s
Unconstitutional foreign policy implications may consist of "offending
our foreign trading partners and leading them to retaliate against the
nation as a whole,"139 or other adverse foreign policy effects as evi-
denced by action taken by the Executive Branch or Congress.140
Whether a state tax violates a clear federal directive requires some
sort of federal preemption analysis. Since federal legislation has not
been enacted in the area of foreign taxation, the existence of any fed-
eral preemption appears unlikely.141
5. Present Judicial Status
The constitutional limitations on the power of states to tax multiju-
risdictional corporations have recently been applied to several taxing
schemes. Courts have also been actively interpreting the statutes to
determine whether the legislature has properly provided for specific
revenue collections. Although precise guidelines have not evolved
from the flurry of judicial activity, a pattern of judicial analysis is
emerging. Through a process of statutory interpretations and applica-
tion of the established constitutional restrictions, the courts are test-
ing states' apportionment schemes by evaluating three interdependent
elements: (1) the existence of a unitary business, (2) the taxable base,
and (3) the validity of the apportionment formula.
even if California adopted the arm's-length method, it would be required
to defer, not merely to a single internationally accepted bright line stan-
dard, as was the case in Japan Line, but to a variety of § 482-type reallo-
cation decisions made by individual foreign countries in individual cases.
Although double taxation is a constitutionally disfavored state of affairs,
particularly in the international context, Japan Line does not require
forbearance so extreme or so one-sided.
Id. at 2955.
138. Id. at 2955.
139. Id. The Court recognized that the judiciary was largely unable to determine
whether retaliation was a legitimate threat and seemed to ask Congress to bal-
ance the risks involved. However, since little congressional guidance existed, the
Court reviewed several objective standards in an attempt to discern the risk the
tax would have on foreign relations and trade. Those factors included: (1) the
creation of automatic asymmetry in international taxation, (2) the imposition of
the tax on a foreign corporation versus a domestic entity, and (3) the probability
that the taxpayer is amenable to be taxed by the state in some form. See id. at
2955-56.
140. The Court noted that the lack of federal opposition to state tax, when combined
with the objective factors, weighed against finding California's tax unconstitu-
tional. See id at 2956.
141. The Court noted that no federal statutes or tax treaties preempted a state's au-
thority to tax the foreign income of corporations within the state's taxing jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 2956.
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a. Unitary Business Requirement
The unitary business requirement must be met before a state can
apply its apportionment formula to the interstate income of a multiju-
risdictional corporation.142 As a result of this threshold requirement,
a state may not tax interstate income unless it has first been estab-
lished that the corporation is a unitary business.143 Generally, a uni-
tary business may be defined as a business "whose activities outside
the taxing state bear such an interdependent relationship to those
within the taxing state that [it] is impossible to measure their separate
contribution to the overall profit of the multistate enterprise."144
The initial judicial determination of a unitary business is made by
the state courts. The United States Supreme Court has noted that,
where reasonably possible, deference will be made to the judgment of
the state courts in determining whether a particular set of activities
constitutes a unitary business.145 The taxpaying corporation is the
party with the burden of showing that a unitary business does not ex-
ist.146 The taxpayer must show by clear and cogent evidence that the
particular tax results in extraterritorial values being taxed.147
The corporation's burden is hampered by the lack of clear guidance
by the courts as to what does or does not constitute a unitary business.
However, the taxpayer does know that the existence of a unitary busi-
ness depends upon a factual analysis.148 Since the unitary business
concept depends upon a factual determination, cases illustrating what
does or does not constitute a unitary business are instructive.149
InASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax CommissionL50 andF. W. Wool-
worth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Department,15 the Supreme Court
142. The unitary business concept has been referred to as the "linchpin of apportion-
ability." See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 223 (1980);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the judicial development of the unitary business requirement in the
Supreme Court, see Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional
Corporations and the Supreme Court, 35 NA'L TAX J. 401 (1982).
143. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 223 (1980).
144. Comment, Formulating Apportionment, supra note 19, at 729. See also Maxwell
v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N.C. 365, 369, 168 S.E. 397, 399 (1933).
145. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2945 (1983). The
Court stated what was to be its limit of review in deciding whether a unitary
business existed: "[Olur task must be to determine whether the state court ap-
plied the correct standards to the case; and if it did, whether its judgment 'was
within the realm of permissible judgment."' I- at 2946.
146. See ida at 2945.
147. See id
148. See id. at 2947-48.
149. The factual intricacies of what constitutes a unitary business is beyond the scope
of this Article. For additional information, see Hellerstein, supra note 142.
150. 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982).
151. 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982).
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focused on the unitary business principle by narrowing what the con-
cept entails. In ASARCO, Inc., the Supreme Court found that
ASARCO and its five subsidiaries did not constitute a unitary business
and rejected Idaho's argument that the income should be considered a
part of a unitary business if intangible property is used for the "pur-
pose" of relating to the corporation's business.152 The Court required
some type of ownership or control to unite the corporations in-
volved.153 In F. W. Woolworth Co., the Court found that stock owner-
ship by the taxpayer of its subsidiaries and the ability to elect all of the
directors of the subsidiaries were not enough alone to find a unitary
business.-5 4
In Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board,355
the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the requirements of a unitary
business. The Court, in analyzing the present case and the previously
decided cases, noted that the commerce and the due process clauses
required the unitary business concept to include the following ele-
ments: (1) some part of the business must be conducted in the state;15 6
(2) some bond of ownership or control must unite the purported uni-
tary business; 157 and (3) the out-of-state activities of the unitary busi-
ness must be "related in some concrete way to the in-State
activities."15s The Court also recognized and approved California's use
152. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 3103, 3111-16 (1982). The
Court in ASARCO, Inc. stated:
This definition of unitary business would destroy the concept. The busi-
ness of a corporation requires that it earn money to continue operations
and to provide a return on its invested capital. Consequently all of its
operations, including any investment made, in some sense can be said to
be "for purposes related to or contributing to the [corporation's]
business."
Id. at 3114 (emphasis in original).
153. See id. at 3122-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
154. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 102 S. Ct. 3128, 3134 (1982).
Specifically, the Court stated:
Our decision in ASARCO makes clear, however, that the potential to
operate a company as part of a unitary business is not dispositive when,
looking at "the 'underlying economic realities of a unitary business,'"
the dividend income from the subsidiaries in fact is "derive[d] from 'un-
related business activity' which constitutes a 'discrete business
enterprise.' "
Id. (emphasis in original).
155. 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983). For a thorough discussion of the issues involved in
Container Corporation of America, see Note, supra note 129.
156. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220 (1980); Wisconsin v.
J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
157. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 3103, 3109-11 (1982); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 445 U.S. 425, 438-42 (1980).
158. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2940 (1983). The
Court elaborated on the third requirement by stating:
The functional meaning of this requirement is that there be some shar-
ing or exchange of value not capable of precise identification or measure-
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of an administrative presumption that corporations engaged in the
same line of business are unitary.159
The Court in Container Corporation of America noted that a pre-
requisite to a constitutionally acceptable finding of a unitary business
was a flow of value between the corporate units.160 The flow of value
requirement has resulted in the Supreme Court recognizing two dif-
ferent types of corporate structures as unitary businesses. First, a uni-
tary business has been found when the various corporate units result
in a vertically integrated business.161 Second, a unitary business has
also been recognized when the corporate units consist of a series of
similar businesses "operating separately in various jurisdictions but
linked by common managerial or operational resources that produced
economies of scale and transfers of value."162
ment-beyond the mere flow of funds arising out of a passive investment
or a distinct business operation-which renders formula apportionment
a reasonable method of taxation.
Id
159. Id at 2947. The Court stated:
This presumption did enter into the state court's reasoning, but only as
one element among many. Moreover, considering the limited use to
which it was put, we find the "presumption" criticized by appellant to be
reasonable. Investment in a business enterprise truly "distinct" from a
corporation's main line of business often serves the primary function of
diversifying the corporate portfolio and reducing the risks inherent in
being tied to one industry's business cycle. When a corporation invests
in a subsidiary that engages in the same line of work as itself, it becomes
much more likely that one function of the investment is to make better
use-either through economies of scale or through operational integra-
tion or sharing of expertise-of the parent's existing business-related
resources.
I& at 2947.
160. Id- The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that a flow-of-goods test must be
adopted, although such a test is permissible. Id-
161. Id. at 2940-41. A vertically integrated business exists when different corporate
activities are functionally integrated; e.g., production, refining, and selling of min-
erals. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 4, at 8.11(4)(e).
162. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2941 (1980). The
Court stated: "As we reiterated in F. W. Woolworth, a relevant question in the
unitary business inquiry is whether 'contributions to income [of the subsidiaries]
result[ed] from functional integration, centralization of management, and econo-
mies of scale.'" Id at 2947. One commentator has summarized the status of the
unitary concept after reviewing the Supreme Court cases through F.W. Wool-
worth as follows:
We now know, for example, that functional integration, centralization of
management, and economies of scale are key factors in determining
whether there is a unitary or discrete business enterprise; that owner-
ship by itself, regardless of its extent, does not make one business uni-
tary with another; that potential as distinguished from actual managerial
control will not justify a finding of unity; that a flow of products, person-
nel, and services among entities evidences the existence of a unitary
business and the lack thereof evidences its absence; and that the in-
terchange of some goods and the maintenance of some managerial links
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The presence of a unitary business is a prerequisite to state taxa-
tion of interstate income. However, it should be noted that the uni-
tary business concept does not give rise to one idea of taxation as
opposed to another idea.163 Therefore, finding that various corporate
units are unitary does not necessarily require the state to tax certain
income or apportion such income on a worldwide basis as opposed to
some other basis.16 4 The extent of the income taxed and the appor-
tionment of that income depends, in part, upon the constitutional limi-
tations and, in part, on statutory construction.
b. Tax Base
Before the Supreme Court in Container Corporation of America
made a distinction between determining the existence of a unitary
business and analyzing the statutes providing for the tax base and ap-
portionment formula, the determination of whether a state could in-
clude particular income in a corporation's taxable income depended
upon finding of a unitary business. The effect that Container Corpora-
tion of America may have on this distinction is not known since the
Court did not address the issue. However, if the Court actually did
rest the unitary business requirement on the "nexus" requirement of
due process grounds, and the apportionment formula on the "rational
relationship" ground, some means other than the determination of the
existence of a unitary business may be required to determine whether
certain income may be taxed.
c. Apportionment
The standards established in Container Corporation of America
dealing with the formula appear to continue to give the states consid-
erable leeway in apportioning interstate income. The Court noted
that under the due process clause and the commerce clause, the appor-
tionment must be fair.165 "Fairness" requires that the formula be in-
between entities will not inexorably lead to the conclusion that they are
unitary. Whether this "guidance" will actually calm the waters in this
troubled area, however, is another question ....
Hellerstein, supra note 140, at 421.
163. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2941 (1983). Specifi-
cally, the Court stated:
A final point that needs to be made about the unitary business concept is
that it is not, so to speak, unitary: there are variations on the theme, and
any number of them are logically consistent with the underlying princi-
ples motivating the approach. For example, a State might decide to re-
spect formal corporate lines and treat the ownership of a corporate
subsidiary as per se a passive investment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
164. Id. at 2942.
165. Id.; Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219 (1980); Moor-
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ternally and externally consistent.166 A formula is considered to be
internally consistent if the same formula, as is applied by every juris-
diction, would result in no more than all of the unitary businesses'
income being taxed.167 External consistency is achieved if the factors
in the apportionment formula reflect a reasonable approximation of
how income is generated.16S
Internal consistency problems rarely exist if every taxing jurisdic-
tion employs the same apportionment formula. The risk of double
taxation arises when different apportionment formulas are used,169
and the problem is especially acute when foreign jurisdictions are in-
volved.17o However, the Supreme Court has been tolerant towards the
differing apportionment formulas. In Moorman Manufacturing Com-
pany v. Bair,171 the Court upheld Iowa's single factor formula. The
Court stated that actual double taxation had to be shown; it was not
enough to show that two different apportionment formulas could have
resulted in double taxation.172 The Court has given similar deference
when the differing formulas were between states and foreign
countries.1 73
The antidiscrimination requirement of the commerce clause will
not invalidate a formula unless the formula was unfair.174 The
Container Corporation of America Court stated: "At least in the in-
man Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North
Carolina ez reL Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 134 (1931).
The burden is on the corporation to show that "there is no rational relation-
ship between the income attributed to the state and the intrastate values of the
enterprise." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980).
166. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2942 (1983).
167. Id. "Internal consistency of the formula involves whether, if applied by every
taxing jurisdiction, the formula would result in taxation of an income greater
than the income of the unitary-business." Note, supra note 131, at 640.
168. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2942 (1983).
External consistency involves whether the apportionment formula actu-
ally produces a reasonable picture of the generation of income. Under
the external consistency component, the taxpayer corporation does not
meet its burden of proof by merely showing that the apportionment
formula may result in the taxation of income that did not have its source
in the taxing state. The taxpayer, to invalidate use of an apportionment
formula, must present "clear and cogent evidence" that the income ap-
portioned to the state is "out of all appropriate proportion to the business
transacted ... in that State," or has "led to a grossly distorted result."
Note, supra note 131, at 640 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis original).
169. As was noted earlier, not every state taxes multijurisdictional corporations the
same. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
171. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
172. See id at 276. See also Hellerstein, supra note 142, at 403.
173. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
174. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2943 (1983). Under
the commerce clause, an apportionment formula must not result in discrimina-
tion against interstate or foreign commerce.
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terstate commerce context, however, the antidiscrirnination principle
has not in practice required much in addition to the requirement of
fair apportionment." 175
The burden is with the taxpaying corporation to show by "clear
and cogent evidence"176 that there is no rational relationship between
the income attributed to the state and the intrastate values of the en-
terprise.177 The corporation can carry its burden by showing that the
income apportioned is "out of all appropriate proportion to the busi-
ness transacted in that state." 7 8 The success of a corporation carrying
this burden is in doubt, especially if the state uses a three-factor
formula. The Supreme Court approved the three-factor formula in
1942179 and has now stated that the formula has become a benchmark
by which to judge other apportionment formulas. 80
III. NEBRASKA TAXATION OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
CORPORATIONS
A. Statutory Development
Until the Kellogg Company case, Nebraska experienced little oppo-
sition to the establishment and development of its income tax on mul-
tijurisdictional corporations. Although the initial enactment of a state
income tax met with some resistance, the legislature and the courts
have since been relatively inactive.'18
175. Id. Previously, the Court recognized that the elimination of all overlapping taxa-
tion would require a single method of taxation and that such a task must be un-
dertaken by Congress. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-80 (1978).
176. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2942 (1983).
177. Id. at 2948.
178. Id. See also Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex. rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S.
123, 135 (1931).
179. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
180. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2943 (1983). The
Court stated:
The three-factor formula used by California has gained wide approval
precisely because payroll, property, and sales appear in combination to
reflect a very large share of the activities by which value is generated. It
is therefore able to avoid the sorts of distortions that were present in
Hans Rees' Sons, Inc.
Of course, even the three-factor formula is necessarily imperfect.
But we have seen no evidence demonstrating that the margin of error
(systematic or not) inherent in the three-factor formula is greater than
the margin of error (systematic or not) inherent in the sort of separate
accounting urged upon us by appellant.
Id. at 2949-50 (footnote omitted).
181. The Nebraska unicameral has amended the statutes imposing the tax on multiju-
risdictional corporations several times. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734(2) (Supp.
1983). However, the apportionment formula remains unchanged since its enact-
ment. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2735 to -2752 (1981). The Nebraska Supreme




In 1965, the Nebraska Legislature enacted an individual and corpo-
rate net income tax to become effective on January 1, 1967,182 but in
the following general election, the voters rejected the legislators' at-
tempt to enact a state income tax.183 However, in 1966 the state con-
stitution was amended, 84 and on April 12, 1967, the legislature
enacted a state income tax based on the federal income tax law.185
The law levied a direct income tax on the net income of corporations
engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce or both186 and a
franchise tax on corporations exercising their franchises or doing busi-
ness in Nebraska. 87 It is the franchise tax that provides for Ne-
braska's taxation of multijurisdictional corporations.' 8 8
2. Substance of Nebraska's Original Multijurisdictional Tax
Nebraska's original corporate income tax as applied to multijuris-
dictional corporations 8 9 imposes a tax on a corporation's entire net
except to hold that the taxing provisions were constitutional. See infra notes 201-
02 and accompanying text.
182. State Income Tax, ch. 465, 1965 Neb. Laws 1476 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 77-2701 to -2721 (Cum. Supp. 1965)). For corporations, net income was federal
taxable income as defined in the federal tax code. The Nebraska Constitution
provides the general authority to tax. See NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("The neces-
sary revenue of the state and its governmental subdivisions shall be raised by
taxation in such manner as the Legislature may direct."). This income tax is Ne-
braska's original income tax. Amendments to the original income tax on multiju-
risdictional corporations are discussed in section III, D of this article.
183. In Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966), the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the referendum petition was valid.
184. NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 1B ("When an income tax is adopted by the Legislature,
the Legislature may adopt an income tax law based upon the laws of the United
States.").
185. Sales, Use, Income, Franchise Tax Act, ch. 487, 1967 Neb. Laws 1533 (codified at
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2701 to -27141 (Cum. Supp. 1967)). The voters rejected an
initiative petition in 1968 that proposed to amend the Nebraska Constitution to
prohibit Nebraska from levying an income tax for state purposes. The state is
prohibited from levying a property tax for state purposes. See NEB. CONST. art.
VIII, 1A.
The constitutionality of the income tax was upheld in Anderson v. Tiemann,
182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967)(the legislature has authority to enact a state
income tax which incorporates the future income tax laws of the United States).
186. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734(1) (Supp. 1983); NEB. ADMIN. R. § 24-001 (1975).
187. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734(2) (Supp. 1983); NEB. ADMIN. R. § 24-002 (1975).
See supra note 17.
188. The distinction between income and franchise taxes is no longer necessary after
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). See supra notes 17 &
115.
189. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734(2) (Supp. 1983). A multijurisdictional corporation
must be unitary before it is taxed by Nebraska. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2736 to
-2737 (1981); supra note 142 and accompanying text. The Department of Revenue
has defined a unitary business as follows:
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If a particular trade or business is carried on within and without this
state by a single taxpayer or one or more affiliated corporations, the
business enterprise shall be considered to be unitary in nature if either
of two "attributes of unity"[,] operational unity and economic, are pres-
ent.
Operational unity is defined as (1) unity of ownership, (2) unity of
operation by centralized purchasing, advertising, accounting, and man-
agement divisions, and (3) unity of use in its centralized executive force
and general system of operation. Unity of ownership shall mean control
of more than fifty percent of the voting stock issued and outstanding of
any affiliated corporation. Unity of operation shall mean utilization of
centralized services such as: accounting, financing, legal, union rela-
tions, advertising, etc. Unity of use shall mean utilization of a central-
ized executive force or the horizontal or vertical flow of goods and
services between states or members of an affiliated group of corpora-
tions.
Economic unity is defined as one part of the trade or business of a
single taxpayer or one or more affiliated corporations being dependent
upon or contributing to other parts of the trade or business. Economic
dependency shall mean one part of the trade or business receiving from
the other parts of the trade or business such items as capital, manage-
ment, goods, or services, etc. Economic contribution shall mean one part
of the trade or business supplying to the other parts of the trade or busi-
ness such items as capital, management, goods, or services, etc.
If either of the "attributes of unity" exist, a single taxpayer or one or
more affiliated corporations shall be engaged in the conduct of a single
unitary business enterprise.
NEB. ADMIN. R. § 24-017 (1975) (section headings omitted). See also NEa. ADMIN.
R. §§ 24-020 to -022 (1975).
Additionally, the Revenue Department has adopted regulations attempting to
isolate factors which would raise a presumption of a unitary business. Those reg-
ulations provide:
A taxpayer may have more than one "trade or business." In such
cases, it is necessary to determine the business income attributable to
each separate trade or business. The income of each business is then
apportioned by an apportionment formula which takes into considera-
tion the instate and outstate factors which relate to the trade or business
the income of which is being apportioned.
The determination of whether the activities of the taxpayer consti-
tute a single trade or business or more than one trade or business will
turn on the facts in each case. In general, the activities of the taxpayer
will be considered a single business if there is evidence to indicate that
the segments under consideration are integrated with, dependent upon,
or contribute to each other and the operations of the taxpayer as a
whole. The following factors are considered to be good indicia of a single
trade or business, and the presence of any of these factors creates a
strong presumption that the activities of the taxpayer constitute a single
trade or business:
Same type of business. A taxpayer is generally engaged in a single
trade or business when all of its activities are in the same general
line,
Steps in a vertical process. A taxpayer is almost always engaged in a
single trade or business when its various divisions or segments are
engaged in different steps in a large, vertically structured enterprise,
Strong centralized management. A taxpayer which might otherwise
be considered as engaged in more than one trade or business is prop-
erly considered as engaged in one trade or business when there is a
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income derived from all sources within Nebraska.190 A corporation's
"entire net income" generally consists of that portion of its federal
taxable income attributed to Nebraska as determined by sections
which parallel the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
(UDITPA).191
Nebraska uses a corporation's federal taxable income as the tax
base.192 Using the federal income tax as the taxable base necessarily
includes the many adjustments to a corporation's net income inherent
in the federal tax laws as well as the additional adjustments made by
Nebraska. 19 3 The character of the tax base is directed into business or
nonbusiness income in order to determine the correct means of attrib-
uting the income to Nebraska.
Nonbusiness income 194 is specifically allocated to Nebraska,195 and
the statutes expressly provide for specifically allocating certain items
of income. 196 Separate accounting may be used to attribute business
strong central managment, coupled with the existence of centralized
departments for such functions as financing, advertising, research, or
purchasing. Thus, some conglomerates may properly be considered
as engaged in only one trade or business when the central executive
officers are normally involved in the operations of the various divi-
sions and there are centralized offices which perform for the divisions
the normal matters which a truly independent business would per-
form for itself, such as accounting, personnel, insurance, legal,
purchasing, advertising, or financing.
NEB. ADMIN. R. § 24-010 (1975) (section headings omitted).
It is evident from the above regulations that the Revenue Department would
generally rather use the apportionment formula.
190. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734(2) (Supp. 1983). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2736
(1981) (Any corporation having income from business activity which is taxable
both within and without Nebraska shall allocate and apportion its net income as
provided.). For a discussion on the mechanics of Nebraska's original corporate
income tax law, see Prinz, Nebraska Income Tax: Corporations, 2 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 78 (1968). The original income tax has been amended by L.B. 1124. See
infra notes 273-311 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text. Nebraska adopted the Multistate
Tax Compact in 1967, including the UDITPA. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2901
(1981). The UDITPA is also reprinted in the codified sections of the Nebraska
statutes. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2735 to -2752 (1981).
192. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734(2) (Supp. 1983).
193. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2716 (Supp. 1983).
194. "Nonbusiness income shall mean all income other than business income." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 77-2735(4) (1981).
195. See Prinz, supra note 190, at 83 n.22.
196. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2738 (1981) (Certain income, to the extent that it is non-
business income, will be specifically allocated to Nebraska and will not be subject
to apportionment). Specifically allocated income includes the following items:
net rents and royalties from real property and tangible personal property in Ne-
braska, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2739 (1981); gains and losses from real property
and tangible personal property in Nebraska, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2740 (1981);
interest and dividends if the corporation is domiciled in Nebraska, see NEB. REv.
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nonbusiness income197 to Nebraska where that portion of a corpora-
tion's taxable income is "separate and distinct" from income derived
from other states.198 In most other cases, the amount of a corpora-
tion's income derived from sources within Nebraska is determined by
the apportionment method.19 9
STAT. § 77-2741 (1981); and patents and copyrights, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2742
(1981). See also NEB. ADMIN. R. § 24-011 (1975).
197. Business income is defined as income arising from transactions and activities in
the regular course of the corporation's business and includes income from all
property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the property consti-
tute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business. See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 77-2735(1) (1981); NEB. ADMIN. R. § 24-009.01 (1975).
Additionally, the Department of Revenue has issued regulations classifying
certain income:
The classification of income by the tables occasionally used, such as
manufacturing income, compensation for services, sales income, interest,
dividends, rents, royalties, gains, operating income, nonoperating in-
come, etc., is of no aid in determining whether income is business or non-
business income. Income of any type or class and from any source is
business income if it arises from transactions and activity occurring in
the regular course of a trade or business. Accordingly, the critical ele-
ment in determining whether income is "business income" or "nonbusi-
ness income" is the identification of the transactions and activity which
are the elements of a particular trade or business. In general all transac-
tions and activities of the taxpayer which are dependent upon or contrib-
ute to the operation of the taxpayer's economic enterprise as a whole
constitute the taxpayer's trade or business and will be transactions and
activity arising in the regular course of, and will constitute integral parts
of, a trade or business.
NEB. ADMIN. R. § 24-009.03 (1975).
198. Apportionment factors shall not be used if the taxable income derived from
sources within Nebraska is "separate and distinct" from the sources derived from
sources outside Nebraska. Separate accounting would then be the appropriate
attribution method. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2743(1) (1981).
199. In other words, the remaining portion of a corporation's business income is appor-
tioned to Nebraska. Although the very nature of a multijurisdictional corpora-
tion fulfills the jurisdiction requirement, the statutes provide that apportionment
must be used if the corporation is subject to tax by other states. See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 77-2736 (1981). A corporation is deemed to be taxable in another state if
"(1) in that state he is subject to a net income tax, a franchise tax measured by
net income, a franchise tax for the privilege of doing business, or a corporate
stock tax, or (2) that state has jurisdiction to subject the taxpayer to a net income
tax regardless of whether, in fact, the state does or does not." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 77-2737 (1981).
One commentator illustrated the allocation/separate accounting and appor-
tionment distinction as follows:
Of course the total taxable income is derived from within Nebraska
where the taxpayer carries on all of its business activity within Nebraska
and all of its property is located in the state, even though most of its
business is deemed to be in interstate commerce. Where, however, the
taxpayer carries on business activity in another state which is sufficient
in nature to give the other state jurisdiction to impose a tax on or mea-
sured by net income, Nebraska permits apportionment and taxes only a
portion of net income.
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Nebraska uses the common three-factor formula to apportion a
corporation's federal taxable income attributable to Nebraska.200 The
apportionment formula has traditionally been applied by the Revenue
Department on a total domestic basis. The application of Nebraska's
formula may be illustrated as follows:
Taxable Total Federal Property, Payroll & Sales in Nebraska
Income = Taxable/Domestic X Property, Payroll & Sales of Corporations Subject
to the IRC
The formula uses all domestic values in computing the fraction and
applies the fraction to the corporation's domestic income. If the
method of specific allocation of nonbusiness income and apportion-
ment of business income of corporations by the three-factor formula
does not give a fair representation of a taxpayer's activities in Ne-
braska, alternative methods may be used.201
Prinz, supra note 190, at 81 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis original).
200. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2743(2) to -2751 (1981); NEB. ADMIN. R. §§ 24-023 to -040
(1975). The mathematical formula for Nebraska's apportionment is the same as
for the UDITPA. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
201. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2752 (1981); NEB. ADMIN. R. § 24-041 (1975). Such alter-
native methods include: (1) separate accounting, (2) exclusion of one or more of
the three factors in the formula, (3) inclusion of one or more additional factors in
the formula, or (4) any other method which fairly represents the corporation's
activity in Nebraska. Id All other income is apportioned using the apportion-
ment factors. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2743(2) (1981); NEB. ADMIN. R. § 24-015.01
(1975).
The Department of Revenue lists the requirements to be satisfied before a
taxpayer engaged in a multistate business may separately account taxable income
to Nebraska:
Before a taxpayer engaged in a multistate business may separately ac-
count taxable income to Nebraska, the following requirements shall be
satisfied:
The books and records are kept by recognized accounting standards to
accurately reflect the amount of income of the multistate business which
was realized in Nebraska during the taxable period,
The management functions of the business operations within Nebraska
are separate and distinct so that in conducting the Nebraska business
operations the management within Nebraska did not utilize or incur cen-
tralized management services consisting of operation supervision, adver-
tising, accounting, insurance, financing, personnel, physical facilities,
technical and research, sales and servicing, or purchasing during the tax-
able period,
The business operations are separate and distinct and do not contribute
to the overall operations of the company, and there are no interstate,
intercompany, or interdivisional purchases, sales, or transfers during the
taxable period.
If the taxpayer does not satisfy all three requirements stated above, then
the taxpayer shall determine Nebraska taxable income by use of the ap-
portionment formula.




1. General Judicial Interpretation
Until the decision in Kellogg Company, there had been a general
lack of judicial activity in Nebraska concerning the state's corporate
income tax. In Anderson v. Tiemann,202 the general constitutionality
of the tax20 3 was tested and upheld on various grounds. Sixteen years
would pass before the Nebraska Supreme Court would interpret the
state's corporate income tax.
2. Kellogg Company v. Herrington 204
a. The Facts
Kellogg Company is a multijurisdictional corporation engaged in
the manufacturing and selling of food products. 205 Kellogg received
dividends and "know-how" fees 206 from several foreign subsidaries
and reported this amount as nonbusiness income allocable to Michigan
from 1968 through 1972. After auditing Kellogg's records, Nebraska's
Department of Revenue issued deficiency notices,207 which Kellogg
Company appealed.
The company appealed to the district court in Lancaster County,
advancing two arguments. First, Kellogg claimed that the dividends,
interest, and technical fees from the foreign subsidiaries during the
audited periods should not be considered income.208 Second, Kellogg
argued that the statutory apportionment factors were to be based on a
worldwide basis.209 The district court concluded that the amounts re-
ceived by Kellogg from its foreign subsidiaries should be included in
Kellogg's taxable income for apportionment purposes and that the ap-
202. 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967).
203. Nebraska Revenue Act of 1967, ch. 487, 1967 Neb. Laws 1533.
204. Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 343 N.W.2d 326 (1984).
205. IM at 139, 343 N.W.2d at 328. Kellogg Company was incorporated in Delaware;
headquartered in Battle Creek, Michigan; owned several plants in the United
States, including a plant in Omaha, Nebraska, and domestic subsidiaries, that
were not at issue in this case, and controlled 17 foreign subsidiaries. See id at
139-40, 343 N.W.2d at 328.
206. The "know-how" fees were payments for the use of trade secrets, technical infor-
mation, trademark rights, and technical assistance developed by the Kellogg
Company. See id. at 140, 343 N.W.2d at 328.






Id. The total amount of the deficiency judgment was $203,001, including interest.
See i&L
208. See id. at 140, 343 N.W.2d at 328-29.
209. See id at 141, 343 N.W.2d at 329.
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portionment factor should be based on a worldwide basis.2 10 The Rev-
enue Department appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the income of
foreign subsidiaries is not taxable by Nebraska since this income is not
directly subject to federal income taxation. Nebraska's adoption of the
federal tax base precluded Nebraska from including in its base income
not includable in federal taxable income. 211 The Revenue Depart-
ment also argued that if worldwide apportionment was to be used,
then the entire net income must be used, but if the federal taxable
income is used, then the apportionment factors of only domestic oper-
ations should be used.212 The Revenue Department's position can be
illustrated as follows:
Nebraska Federal Taxable Income Nebraska Property, Payroll & Sales
Taxable = Including Dividends of X Total Property, Payroll & Sales of
Income Foreign Subsidiaries United States Parent and Subsidiaries
Kellogg claimed that: (1) the company's tax returns had been filed
on the basis that the dividends, interest, and technical fees were non-
business income;21 3 and (2) if "the foreign source income items were
properly classified as 'business income,' then apportionment to the
state of Nebraska should be on a 'worldwide' basis."21 4 Kellogg's in-
terpretation of the statute can be illustrated as follows:
210. The district court concluded that the tax base must be based on Kellogg's subsidi-
aries' worldwide income and worldwide values of property, payroll, and sales. See
id.
211. Brief of Appellant at 6, Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 343 N.W.2d 326
(1984). Specifically, the Department argued the folloving.
[Section 77-2734] provides that the taxpayer's entire net income shall be
its federal taxable income derived from sources within the state. To in-
clude in the state calculation of net income the net income earned by
foreign corporations, which do not file federal income tax returns, would
appear to be a questionable interpretation of the Nebraska statute ....
On the other hand, the dividends received by Kellogg from its foreign
subsidiaries were includable in its federal taxable income.
Id (emphasis in original).
212. See id. at 8. See supra text accompanying notes 200-01. The Nebraska Supreme
Court recited the state's arguments as follows:
(1) The district court should not have found that combined reporting of
the income of an affiliated group of corporations is permitted or required
by Nebraska statutes.
(2) The district court should have found that business income should in-
clude dividends and other payments made to a parent corporation by a
foreign subsidiary.
(3) The district court should have found that Kellogg had not met its
burden of proof, and the lower court should not, therefore, have re-
manded the case back to the tax commissioner for further proceedings.
See Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 141, 343 N.W.2d 326, 329 (1984).
213. Brief for Appellee at 3, Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 343 N.W.2d 326
(1984).
214. Id. at 4. Kellogg was essentially arguing for a complete worldwide approach. See
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Federal Taxable Income
Nebraska Less Dividends from Nebraska Property, Payroll & Sales
Taxable = Foreign Subsidiaries X Property, Payroll & Sales of Parent
Income Plus Foreign Subsidiary and all Subsidiaries in the World
Net Income
Kellogg Company contended that the worldwide apportionment
method was required by the due process clause of the United States
Constitution and by a clear, unambiguous reading of the statute.215
Claiming that the Nebraska statutes adopted the unitary method of
reporting business income,216 Kellogg contended that the entire taxa-
ble income of all of its domestic and foreign subsidiaries should be ag-
gregated and that apportionment should be on a worldwide basis.217
Adopting a strict constructionist view, the Nebraska Supreme
Court generally adopted the position argued by Kellogg Company.
b. The Decision
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Kellogg Company initially found
that Kellogg was a unitary business and was subject to Nebraska's ap-
portionment method of taxation of interstate income.2 18 The court
also observed that Kellogg abandoned its initial argument that Ne-
braska was not able to collect a tax on income which may not have
been earned in Nebraska.219 The decision addressing the merits of the
215. Id at 16, 20. The Nebraska Supreme Court did not look to the Constitution but
looked to the statute to find that worldwide apportionment was required. See
infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
216. When describing the legislative intent regarding the adoption of the UDITPA,
Kellogg admitted that no specific legislative history existed on the specific issue
of apportionment. See id at 10. However, Kellogg then "guessed" at the legisla-
tive intent by stating: "[Tihe intent of the legislature in adopting the uniform act
was clearly to obtain the corporate income tax laws and realize the same results
as the other states which had similarly adopted UDITPA." Id Kellogg also
stated: "The legislative history concerning the statute indicates that UDITPA
was adopted as the state's corporate income tax law with the intent of having
Nebraska enact the same body of law and realize the same results as other states
which had adopted the uniform act." Id at 12.
The problem with Kellogg's interpretation of the legislative intent is that no
states are actually uniform in the application of their apportionment formulas.
See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
217. See id at 8. Kellogg combined the tax base and apportionment under the broad
heading of "unitary" with the implication that the "unitary business method" re-
quired a certain apportionment scheme. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), rejects this idea. See supra notes 163-64 and accompa-
nying text. The Nebraska Supreme Court in Kellogg Company properly rejected
Kellogg's concept of unitary.
218. See Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 142, 343 N.W.2d at 326, 329-30 (1984).
("While the parties to this action raise no issue as to the application of this act, it
is clear that Kellogg conducts a unitary business operation subject to the Uniform
Act.").
219. See id. at 143-44, 343 N.W.2d at 330. The court, after listing the number of cases
where the United States Supreme Court has ruled on the unitary business princi-
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appeal in Kellogg Company is essentially two-fold. First, the court had
to determine what income was to be included in Kellogg's tax base.
Second, the court needed to interpret the statutes detailing the appor-
tionment formula to determine if the factors were to be based on do-
mestic or worldwide values.
The Nebraska Supreme Court decided that the determination of
what income was to be included in Kellogg's tax base was to be de-
cided by interpreting the statute.220 After quoting section 77-2734(2),
the court held that the apportionable income must reflect Kellogg's
federal taxable income. 221 Therefore, the tax base used to determine
Kellogg's income tax liability must consist of those items of income
that were included in Kellogg's federal tax return.2 22
Determining whether the apportionment must be done on a do-
mestic or worldwide basis was decided by statutory interpretation. Af-
ter reviewing the apportionment statutes, the court held the factors
were to be based on Kellogg's worldwide operations.223 The court's
holding was not merely to include in the computation of the three-
factor apportionment Kellogg's total domestic property, payroll, and
sales; instead, the holding required the factors to be computed accord-
ing to Kellogg's property, payroll, and sales on a worldwide basis. The
essence of the court's decision was summarized as follows:
For purposes of § 77-2743 the taxpayer's entire taxable income must be de-
fined by § 77-2734(2), which limits it to the taxpayer's federal taxable income.
This includes dividends and interest and fees paid to it by its foreign subsidiar-
ies, but does not include the income of its foreign subsidiaries. The property
factor, payroll factor, and sales factor must include the taxpayer's worldwide
items. It may very well be, and probably is true, that this does not provide the
State with the result which it had hoped to obtain by adopting the Uniform
Act.
The difficulty, however, is that the Nebraska franchise tax "piggybacks" on
the federal income tax in order to arrive at its principal base. By attempting
to combine the "piggybacking" of the federal income tax with the provisions
of the Uniform Act, it may be that the State realizes the smallest tax possible.
This may be unfortunate, and not what the Legislature intended, but it is, in
fact, what was accomplished. To the extent that the trial court included
worldwide figures for property values, payroll, and sales, it was correct. To
the extent that the trial court included worldwide income, it was in error.22 4
ple and formula apportionment, noted that Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983), approved the California method of imposing a
unitary tax on a multijurisdictional corporation which included all of the income
of the parent corporation and the foreign subsidiaries on a worldwide basis. See
id.
220. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2734(2) (Supp. 1983).
221. Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 145-46, 343 N.W.2d 326, 331 (1984).
222. The consolidated federal income tax return filed for Kellogg and its domestic
subsidiaries included the dividends and "know-how" fees taxable income.
223. Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 148, 343 N.W.2d 326, 332 (1984).
224. TcL at 148-49, 343 N.W.2d at 332-33 (emphasis in original). The court then held:
In view of the fact that we have determined as a matter of law that the
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Illustrating the court's decision by a mathematical formula reveals
that the result is a hybrid formula that lacks internal uniformity:225
Nebraska Federal Taxable Income Nebraska Property, Payroll & Sales
Taxable = Including Dividends of Property, Payroll & Sales of Parent
Income Foreign Subsidiaries X and All Subsidiaries in the World
3. The Analysis
The Kellogg Company decision establishes beneficial precedent on
several unitary taxation issues. The unitary business concept was
properly held to be a threshold requirement,226 and the court ap-
proved a leading judicial definition of unitary business. 227 The court
also correctly noted that the presence of a unitary business does not
dictate the application of a certain income base or apportionment
method.228 The unitary business requirement was recognized as being
a product of the commerce and due process clauses of the Constitu-
tion, while the particular income base and apportionment method is
largely determined by statute, provided the conditions remain within
constitutionally permissible limits.
Yet while the court establishes beneficial precedent for some uni-
tary taxation issues in Kellogg Company, questionable conclusions are
expressed as well, including the two-dimensional approach the court
used in rigidly applying the plain meaning rule. In interpreting Ne-
braska's corporate income tax statute,229 the court relied on several
formula used by the Department of Revenue and approved by the Tax
Commissioner was in excess of statutory authority and contrary to law,
it appears to us that the clear language of § 84-917 required the trial
court to remand this case to the Tax Commissioner for a determination
in accordance with the proper formula. Likewise, on appeal under § 84-
918, we must direct the district court to take such action. That is not to
say that the burden of proof with regard to factual matters does not re-
main with the taxpayer. It is simply to recognize that in this case we do
not reach the factual dispute because of the errors of law committed by
the Tax Commissioner in interpreting the applicable statutes. When the
case returns to the Tax Commissioner, Kellogg will bear the burden of
producing evidence sufficient to establish that a determination made by
the Tax Commissioner is not in accordance with law, if it disagrees with
his determination.
Id at 150, 343 N.W.2d at 333.
225. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
226. See Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 142, 343 N.W.2d 326, 329 (1984).
227. See id. at 141-42, 343 N.W.2d at 329 (quoting Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 84
Ill. 2d 102, 108, 417 N.E.2d 1343, 1347 (1981). See also Weissman, supra note 10, at
48.
228. See Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 146, 343 N.W.2d 326, 331 (1984).
229. The supreme court also held that even though Kellogg Company did not carry its
burden with the Tax Commissioner or with the district court, Kellogg Company
could still appeal, have the case remanded, and then carry its burden on the fac-




canons of statutory interpretation which supposedly guided the court
to hold that the statute taxing multijurisdictional corporations re-
quired:230 (1) a tax base consisting of the corporation's federal taxa-
ble income, and (2) an apportionment of the taxable income on a
worldwide basis.23 1 Although Kellogg challenged Nebraska's tax
structure on constitutional grounds and rules of statutory construc-
tion,232 the court relied exclusively on principles of statutory interpre-
tation to reach its decision.
The court's use of the plain meaning rule of statutory interpreta-
tion to determine that the taxable base must consist of a corporation's
federal taxable income was certainly reasonable, especially when con-
sidering the statute expressly states that the "taxpayer's entire net in-
come shall be its federal taxable income . *"233 Not only are the
words unambiguous, but the intention of the legislature was clearly
expressed in the statute.234 The court was correct in holding that "the
taxpayer's 'entire net income' is determined by the amount of income
reported by the taxpayer on its federal report."235
The supreme court also used the plain meaning rule to interpret
the extent to which the apportionment formula must be applied. Af-
ter citing several judicial rules of statutory construction,236 the court
proceeded to interpret each applicable apportionment statute.237 An
230. See infra note 236.
231. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text. This tax base would include the
income from any subsidiary if the subsidiary was part of the unitary business.
232. See supra note 215.
233. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2734(2) (Supp. 1983).
234. Adkisson v. City of Columbus, 214 Neb. 129, 333 N.W.2d 661 (1983).
235. Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 145, 343 N.W.2d 326, 331 (1984).
236. The court "reminded" itself that certain rules of construction must be followed
by the court. The rules the court chose to remind itself of included:
1. Where words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, no interpreta-
tion is needed to ascertain their meaning, and in the absence of any-
thing to indicate the contrary, words will be given their ordinary
meaning.
2. It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into a stat-
ute that is not warranted by the legislative language.
3. A statute is not to be read as if open to construction as a matter of
course.
4. It is not within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct,
and unambiguous out of a statute.
5. In the construction of a statute which is clear and unambiguous,
courts cannot supply missing language, and it is not within the
court's power to read into a statute meaning which the clear lan-
guage does not warrant.
See id& at 144, 343 N.W.2d at 330.
237. The court initially noted that apportionment depended upon whether or not the
income was separate and distinct. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2743 (1981). The
court stated that this bifurcated approach deviated from the Uniform Act "for
reasons not entirely clear." Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 146, 343
N.W.2d 326, 331 (1984). Dividing the attribution section into two parts should not
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initial determination found that the language of the statute was not
ambiguous, 238 thereby allowing the court to interpret the statutes ac-
cording to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words.239
The property factor was noted to be a product consisting in part of
the average of all of Kellogg's real and personal property owned or
rented and used during the tax period.2 40 Applying the canons of stat-
utory construction previously cited, the court stated "that the lan-
guage is clear and unambiguous. The statute says 'all.' Few words in
the English language are as clear in meaning as is 'all,' unless it is the
word 'everywhere'. ."241 Former interpretations given to the word
"all" were noted as including: (1) "all" includes while; (2) "all" does
not mean some, nor a part; and (3) "all" is commonly understood and
usually does not admit of an exception, addition, or exclusion.242 Re-
lying on this narrow reading of the statute, the court stated:
The Legislature, if it says so may be authorized to limit the factor question
to the United States, if by so doing the formula remains fair and equitable.
[cite omitted] But what the Legislature may do is not the same as what it has
in fact done, and the language of § 77-2744 appears to be clear beyond ques-
tion. All must mean everywhere.
2 4 3
A similar strict construction approach was applied to the payroll and
sales factor provisions.244 After determining that the payroll and sale
factors depended in part on the extent those activities occurred
"everywhere," 245 the court reasoned that full meaning should be given
make any difference in the practical application of the statute. The UDITPA
provides that nonbusiness income should be allocated to the state, and all busi-
ness income must be apportioned to the state. See UDITPA §§ 4, 9 (1957). Thus,
the determination of whether income is unitary and subject to apportionment is
made when the income is classified as business or nonbusiness income. Nebraska
statutes allow this decision to be made at a later time. Under Nebraska statutes,
business income may be separately accounted allocated or apportioned, depend-
ing on whether the income is separate or distinct. The effect is to allow the tax-
payer to argue that even though the income is business income, separate
accounting, and not apportionment, should apply. See supra notes 194-99 and ac-
companying text.
238. See Weiner v. State ex rel. State Real Estate Comm'n, 214 Neb. 404, 333 N.W.2d
915 (1983)(whether words of a statute are ambiguous is a question of law for the
court); Hill v. City of Lincoln, 213 Neb. 517, 330 N.W.2d 471 (1983).
239. The court adopted the approach that if a statute is not ambiguous, the statute will
be given its plain and ordinary meaning. While this position is certainly in line
with the current case law, see Contact, Inc. v. State, 212 Neb. 584, 324 N.W.2d 804
(1982); such a two dimensional approach seems to be unduly limiting. See infra
notes 248-62 and accompanying text.
240. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2744 (1981). See supra note 52.
241. Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 147, 343 N.W.2d 326, 332 (1984).
242. Id. at 147, 343 N.W.2d at 332.
243. Id. (emphasis in original).
244. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2747 (1981) (payroll); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2749 (1981)
(sales). See supra notes 53-54.
245. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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to the word "everywhere":
to [sic] suggest, as the State does, that everywhere means everywhere in the
United States is to attempt to give a meaning to the word not generally recog-
nized nor generally considered in its common meaning. The word "every" is
synonymous with "all" and means all the separate individuals which consti-
tute the whole. Everywhere must therefore mean from all places.2 4 6
Based solely upon a theory of narrow construction, the supreme court
held that the apportionment statutes required worldwide
apportionment.247
By citing several canons of statutory construction requiring the
plain meaning rule, the court implied that no other statutory canons
were relevant. However, several other interpretation principles seem-
ingly could have been used by the court. For example, an applicable
canon requires that statutes be construed to effectuate the intent of
the legislature rather than a literal meaning that would have the ef-
fect of defeating legislative intent.24 8 Another canon requires courts
to discover the legislative intent from the language and give it effect24 9
thereby applying all rules of statutory construction so that no particu-
lar rule is followed to the exclusion of all others.250 The conclusion
that can be drawn after reviewing various interpretive principles is
that for every applicable principle of statutory interpretation there ex-
ists an equal and opposite principle.251 The obvious result appears to
be that the interpretive process depends on a choice between paired
opposites, not illuminated by the canons themselves.252
In addition to the dual choice in selecting a method of statutory
interpretation, the basic validity of interpretive canons, including the
plain meaning rule, has been questioned. For instance, a justification
of the plain meaning rule is that the rule forces the legislature to draft
statutes carefully. However, because of the existence of inconsistent
interpretive principles, it is difficult to imagine that a legislature can
be assured that a statute will be correctly interpreted by the courts if
the legislature had looked to a set of canons when passing the bill.253
246. See Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 147-48, 343 N.W.2d at 326, 332-34
(1984) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
247. Id- at 148, 343 N.W.2d at 332.
248. Adlisson v. City of Columbus, 214 Neb. 129, 333 N.W.2d 661 (1983).
249. Mitchell v. Douglas County, 213 Neb. 355, 329 N.W.2d 112 (1983).
250. PPG Indus. Canada Ltd. v. Kreuscher, 204 Neb. 220, 281 N.W.2d 762 (1979); Equal
Opportunity Comm'n v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 198 Neb. 104, 251 N.W.2d 730 (1977).
251. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521 (1960).
252. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800, 806 (1983).
253. See idi Posner has written:
And, as noted earlier, two inconsistent canons can usually be found for
any specific question of statutory construction. It is therefore unlikely
that the canons considered as a whole stand for some general principle of
limited government and separation of powers. No doubt one could, by
picking and choosing, impose such a principle. But I know of no neutral,
1985]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The canons of statutory construction should be seen for what they
really are-a means to promote judicial activism in any area of law in
which a majority of the court wants to be involved. Instead of con-
straining judicial decisionmaking, the canons merely mask judicial ac-
tivity in matters that may be legislative,254 and the mechanical nature
of statutory interpretation often conceals the true extent to which the
court is making new law.255 The lack of discussion in Kellogg Com-
pany as to the possible legislative intent25 6 is disturbing. This Article
does not necessarily argue that the interpretation in Kellogg Company
was wrong because little legislative intent was expressed. However,
the court may have stopped short in fully interpreting the statutes by
neglecting altogether any mention of the intent of the legislature.257
It would not be totally correct to believe that the legislature, by
enacting a unitary tax, had the intent to raise the most revenues possi-
ble and that, therefore, the apportionment statutes should be broadly
construed. Indeed, by enacting L.B. 1124 in an override of Kellogg
nonpolitical basis on which a judge can decide whether the legislature
should be forced by some version of strict construction to legislate less or
encouraged by some version of loose construction to legislate more.
Id. at 807.
254. Posner writes: "[v]acuous and inconsistent as they mostly are, the canons do not
constrain judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to create the ap-
pearance that his decisions are constrained." Id at 816.
255. See id. at 816-17.
256. There was no discussion of legislative intent even though the appellees argued
legislative intent in their brief. See supra note 216.
257. Admittedly, there is little expressed legislative intent regarding to what extent
the apportionment formula was to be applied. However, the implicit intent in
passing the statute should not be ignored. In advocating abandoning the canons
of statutory interpretations, Posner has recommended the following alternative:
I suggest that the task for the judge called upon to interpret a statute is
best described as one of imaginative reconstruction. The judge should
try to think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting legisla-
tors and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the
case at bar.
Now it is easy to ridicule this approach by saying that judges do not
have the requisite imagination and that what they will do in practice is
assume that the legislators were people just like themselves, so that stat-
utory construction will consist of the judge's voting his own preferences
and ascribing them to the statute's draftsmen. But the irresponsible
judge will twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he desires and
the stupid judge will do the same thing unconsciously. If you assume a
judge who will try with the aid of a reasonable intelligence to put him-
self in the place of the enacting legislators, then I believe he will do bet-
ter if he follows my suggested approach than if he tries to apply the
canons.
Posner, supra note 224, at 817 (footnote omitted). Posner suggests that a judge
look at the "language and apparent purpose of the statute, its background and
structure, its legislative history," the bearing of related statutes, the values and
attitudes of the period in which the legislation was enacted, and "any signs of
legislative intent regarding the freedom with which he should exercise his inter-
pretive function." Id. at 818.
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Company,2 58 the effect was to reduce the amount of revenues col-
lected under the original unitary statutes.25 9 A more realistic ap-
proach to determine the intent would have been to consider the effect
of Nebraska having adopted the uniform law on unitary taxation.
By adopting a uniform law on taxing multijurisdictional corpora-
tions, the legislature expressed an intent that the statutes should be
interpreted in light of the other states adopting a similar law.260 It is
agreed that there is little uniformity existing among the states in ap-
plying a unitary tax. However, internal uniformity within each partic-
ular state is achieved to a sufficient degree when the pure
apportionment combinations are compared to the hybrid models. 261
By adopting the UDITPA, Nebraska arguably expressed an intent that
if uniformity could not be achieved among all the states, the statute
should be interpreted to provide for internal uniformity.
The greatest degree of internal uniformity exists when domestic
income is included with domestic apportionment and worldwide in-
come is included with worldwide apportionment. These traditional
combinations more easily match the income taxed with the corporate
activities in the taxing state. As a result, it would seem reasonable for
the supreme court to adopt the state's view: that being, since domestic
income is Nebraska's tax base, the apportionment factor should be
based on domestic property, payroll, and sales values. 262
C. Effect of Kellogg Company
The full impact of Kellogg Company will not be known for some
time. However, at least two effects of the decision were immediately
apparent. First, the apportionment factor used to calculate the tax lia-
bility of a multijurisdictional corporation was lowered; and second, the
resulting tax liability was significantly lessened.
The mathematical effect of the case may best be shown by an ex-
ample which results in the computation of the apportionment factor.
Assume that a unitary group similar to Kellogg Company had total
income of $200. Of that amount, $125 was reported in the corpora-
tion's federal tax return, $100 being income from regular business op-
erations and $25 being dividends received from the corporation's
foreign subsidiaries. The remaining $75 was income earned by the for-
eign subsidiaries and was not reported in the corporation's federal tax
return. The in-state values of the corporation's property, payroll, and
258. See infra notes 272-313 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
260. Nebraska original income tax of multijurisdictional corporations was modeled af-
ter the UDITPA. See supra note 200.
261. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.




sales were $5, $15, and $20 respectively. The domestic and foreign val-
ues of the corporation's property, payroll, and sales were each $50.
Under the Revenue Department's pre-Kellogg method of taxa-
tion,263 the computations would be as follows:
5 15 20
- + - + - .266 X 125 = 33
3
The figure .266 represents the apportionment fraction that is used in
determining the taxpayer's tax liability. The computations after the
Kellogg Company case would be as follows:264
5 150 205- + _L5 + - = .133 x 125 = 16.62
3
The post-Kellogg computations result in a significantly lower factor
being applied to the corporation's taxable income. By increasing the
denominator in the property, payroll, and sales factors by the tax-
payer's worldwide values, the resulting apportionment factor is
halved.
The general effect on the taxpayer's liability may be illustrated by
applying the apportionment factor to the corporation's income in the
hypothetical example. Under the pre-Kellogg statute, the corporation
would owe $33 in taxes based on the above example.265 Under the
post-Kellogg statute, the taxpayer's liability would be cut in half to
$16.62.266 Computing the tax liability under the formula proposed by
Kellogg Company will reveal that the post-Kellogg formula will collect
the least amount of revenue of the various alternatives.26 7
5 + + = .133 x 200 = 26.60
3
Although the result under the total worldwide approach is not as
favorable to the state as the pre-Kellogg formula, the liability is sub-
stantially higher than under the formula that the court prescribed. To
be sure, multijurisdictional corporations received a favorable result
under the post-Kellogg formula.268
The other effects of the Kellogg Company decision are not as easily
identified. For example, the extent of the revenue losses to Nebraska
may include the altering of outstanding corporate tax assessments and
263. See supra text accompanying notes 213-19.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 224-38.
265. The calculation is as follows: .266 X $125 = $33.
266. The calculation is as follows: .133 X $125 = $16.62.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 224-38.
268. See Revised Provisions Related to Corporate Income Taxation, Hearing on LB.
1124 before the Revenue Comm., 88th Leg., 2nd Sess. 65, 1984, (statement by Eu-
gene Corrigan, Executive Director, Multistate Tax Comm'n) (worldwide factor
applied to a domestic income base is the worst of all formulas).
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the filing of refund claims by taxpayers.269 The future tax receipts
will certainly be reduced270 until corrective legislation is enacted.271
The reduction of tax revenues may require a shifting of the tax bur-
dens if the same level of corporate revenues is desired. The long term
effect of Kellogg Company is not a continuing problem for Nebraska
since the passage of L.B. 1124.272
D. Legislative Response to Kellogg Company-L.B. 1124
Twenty days after the Kellogg Company decision, the Revenue
Committee of the Nebraska Legislature introduced L.B. 1124 on be-
half of the governor.273 The clear intent in enacting L.B. 1124 is to
overrule the Kellogg Company case by reforming the multijurisdic-
tional corporate tax scheme.274 The changes are extensive, consider-
ing the bill repeals the original corporate taxing structure.275
Generally, L.B. 1124 retains the income tax on multijurisdictional
corporations doing business within Nebraksa.276 The Bill also retains
the three-factor apportionment method previously used to apportion a
corporation's interstate income to Nebraska.277 The significant depar-
tures from the original corporate tax scheme include: (1) statutorily
269. Revised Provisions Related to Corporate Income Taxation, Hearing on L.B. 1124
before the Revenue Comm., 88th Leg., 2d Sess. 9 (1984) (statement of Donna
Karnes, State Tax Comm'r, Dept. of Revenue).
270. The Department of Revenue has estimated the potential losses at $10 million per
year at the current rates. See Hearing on L.B. 1124 before the Revenue Comm.,
88th Leg., 2d Sess. 32 (1984) (statement of Donna Karnes, State Tax Comm'r,
Dept. of Revenue).
The total amount of the revenue to be lost cannot be accurately determined
primarily because the Revenue Department does not have the worldwide data
necessary to apply the post-Kellogg formula. The estimate by the Department is
based on the experience of Illinois and Florida when they altered their methods
of taxing multijurisdictional corporations. See Hearing on 1-B. 1124 before the
Revenue Comm., 88th Leg., 2d Sess. 33, 41 (1984) (statement of Donna Karnes,
State Tax Comm'n, Dept. of Revenue).
271. See infra notes 273-315 and accompanying text. It should be noted that any cor-
rective legislation can only have a prospective effect.
272. It should be noted that the significance of Kellogg Co. may be felt in other taxing
jurisdictions with similar broad language in their apportionment statutes.
273. L.B. 1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (1984).
274. See Revised Provisions Related to Corporate Income Taxation, Hearing on LB.
1124 before the Revenue Comm., 88th Leg., 2d Sess. 9 (1984) (statement of Donna
Karnes, State Tax Comm'r, Dept. of Revenue).
275. See L.B. 1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (1984) (repealing NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2734 to -
2752 (1981 & Supp. 1983)). This paper does not dtetail every change presented in
L.B. 1124. The attempt is to focus on the changes affecting the Kellogg Co.
decision.
276. L.B.1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (1984).
277. See id. § 8 (general apportionment factor); § 15 (property factor); § 16 (payroll
factor); § 17 (sales factor).
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defining unitary business, 278 (2) determining what income should be
included in a corporation's tax base,279 and (3) eliminating apportion-
ment on a worldwide basis.28 0
1. Imposition of Tax
Legislative Bill 1124 imposes a tax on corporations that are located
exclusively in Nebraska and corporations that do business not only in
Nebraska but in other states as well.281 The special formulas for at-
tributing interstate income apply if the corporate taxpayer is subject
to taxation in other states.28 2 The statute presumes that a multijuris-
dictional corporation is taxable in another state if any other state has
jurisdiction to apply a tax, regardless whether such a tax is actually
applied.28 3
The use of the term "corporate taxpayer" in the section imposing a
tax on multijurisdictional corporations 28 4 may create a problem when
read with the definition of corporate taxpayer. As defined,285 corpo-
278. See infra 287-95 and accompanying text.
279. See infra notes 296-307 and accompanying text.
280. See infra notes 308-13 and accompanying text.
281. L.B. 1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (1984). The section states:
(1) A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable income
of every corporate taxpayer that is doing business in this state at a rate
equal to twenty-five percent of the rate imposed on individuals under
section 77-2715 on the first fifty thousand dollars of taxable income and
at the rate of thirty-five percent of such rate on all taxable income in
excess of fifty thousand dollars.
Id. at § 5(1).
By imposing the tax on all corporations with activity in Nebraska, the distinc-
tion between direct income taxes and franchise taxes has been eliminated. See
supra note 113.
282. L.B. 1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (1984). Section 5(2) provides:
(2) For a corporate taxpayer that is subject to tax in another state, its
taxable income shall be the portion of the taxpayer's federal taxable in-
come, as adjusted, that is determined to be connected with the taxpayer's
operations in this state pursuant to sections 8 to 19 of the act.
Id. This section recognizes the special nature of multijurisdictional corporations.
283. 1I at § 14(1). Failure to provide proof of filing a return or payment of a tax in
another state creates a presumption that the corporation is not subject to tax in
the other state. See id at § 14(2).
284. Id. at § 5(2).
285. Id. at § 7(3). Corporate taxpayer is defined as follows: "(3) Corporate taxpayer
shall mean any corporation that is not a part of a unitary business or the part of a
unitary business, whether it is one or more corporations, that is doing business in
this state." Id. The grammatical way to read this definition is as follows: "Corpo-
rate taxpayer shall mean any corporation that is not (1) a part of a unitary busi-
ness or (2) the part of a unitary business." The Department of Revenue claims
that the rules of grammar and artful drafting should be ignored so that the defini-
tion is read as follows: "Corporate taxpayer shall mean any corporation that
(1) is not part of a unitary business or (2) is the part of a unitary business."
Although a revenue collection agency would not expect this definition to be inter-
preted in the former manner, a court applying the rules of strict construction
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rate taxpayer may not include any corporation that is a part of a uni-
tary business. Since the application of the special attribution rules
depends on a finding that the corporate group being taxed is uni-
tary,286 the statute as presently drafted may be read as not applying
any apportionment taxation on multijurisdictional corporations.
Given the strict construction the Nebraska Supreme Court used in
Kellogg Company to narrowly interpret the original corporate tax
schemes, perhaps more care should have been used in drafting the def-
initional language of corporate taxpayer.
2. Unitary Business Requirement
The Bill also defines unitary business. Although the court in Kel-
logg Company did not have difficulty with this concept, 28 7 the present
Bill defines the unitary principle in two parts. First, the Bill defines
unitary business as follows:
(13) Unitary business shall mean a business that is conducted as a single eco-
nomic unit by one or more corporations with common ownership and shall
include all activities in different lines of business that contribute to the single
economic unit.
For the purposes of this subdivision, common ownership shall mean one
corporation owning all or part of another corporation.
2 88
After defining the basic principle of a unitary business, the Bill more
specifically details the elements of a unitary business by adopting the
phrase a "single economic unit" to label a unitary business beyond the
fact of common ownership.289 The requirements of a single economic
unit are as follows:
(8) Single economic unit shall mean a business where there is a sharing or
exchange of value between the parts of the unit. A sharing or exchange of
value occurs when the parts of the business are linked by (a) common man-
agement or (b) common operational resources that produce material (i) econo-
mies of scale (ii) transfers of value or (iii) flow of goods, capital, or services
between the parts of the unit;
(A) For the purposes of this subdivision common management includes,
but is not limited to, (I) a centralized executive force or (II) review or
approval authority over long-term operations with or without the exercise
of control over the day-to-day operations; and
(B) For the purposes of this subdivision common operational resources
include, but are not limited to, centralization of any of the following Ac-
counting, advertising, engineering, financing, insurance, legal, personnel,
pension or benefit plans, purchasing, research and development, selling,
may do the unexpected. At the very least the definition is unclear as to its true
meaning.
Corporation is defined as "all corporations and all other entities that are taxed
as corporations under the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at § 7(4).
286. See infra note 291 and accompanying text.
287. Kellogg Co. v. Herrington, 216 Neb. 138, 142, 343 N.W.2d 326, 329 (1984).
288. L.B. 1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. § 7(13) (1984). Unitary group is defined as a "group
of corporations that are conducting a unitary business." Id. at § 7(14).
289. Id. at § 7(13).
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or union relations. 2 9 0
Therefore, the apportionment formula will be applicable if the cor-
porations involved are linked by common ownership, common man-
agement, or common operational resources. The common operational
resource element requires a finding that the resources materially pro-
duce economies of scale; transfers of value; or a flow of goods, capital,
or services between the corporate units.2 9 1 In defining Nebraska's
concept of unitary business, the language used by the United States
Supreme Court in Container Corporation of America is utilized292 and
offers clear statutory guidance in isolating the factors used to deter-
mine a unitary business.
It is important to note what the Bill does not accomplish in the
area of the unitary concept. The Bill does not operate to preclude the
judicial findings of fact necessary to establish a unitary business.293
The Bill does arguably increase the level of activity needed to estab-
lish common operational resources by requiring a material production
of several activities. The material standard certainly lacks the objec-
tiveness sought by the extensive definitions and invites the Depart-
ment of Revenue to issue regulations in an effort to offer guidelines to
both the Department and the taxpayers. It would appear that the ma-
teriality standard will limit the uncommon or irregular relationships
between corporate entities while requiring an established pattern of
some practice reflecting a sharing of operational resources.
The Bill also does not provide for a presumption of a unitary busi-
ness upon the presence of particular factors. The revenue regulations
created a strong presumption that a unitary business existed if the cor-
porate activities included the same type of business, a vertically inter-
grated process, or a strong centralized management.294 After the
passage of L.B. 1124, this presumption probably is no longer
applicable.295
3. Tax Base
Legislative Bill 1124 has retained the federal taxable income of the
multijurisdictional corporations as the applicable tax base.296 Taxable
income is defined as "federal taxable income as adjusted and, if appro-
290. 1I at § 7(8).
291. Compare with the relevant regulations issued by the Department of Revenue.
See supra note 189.
292. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
294. See supra note 189.
295. In fact, after L.B. 1124, it is uncertain to what extent any of the regulations are
still valid. It will certainly take the Department some time to adjust the regula-
tions to L.B. 1124.
296. See L.B. 1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. §§ 5, 6 & 11 (1984).
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priate, as apportioned." 297 The Bill differs from the original corporate
tax scheme in that the taxable income is more clearly defined.298 Leg-
islative Bill 1124 also allows more adjustments to be made to the tax
base than were allowed under the original provisions.299 The federal
taxable income is generally adjusted to recognize losses as follows:
(1) There shall be added to federal taxable income the amount of any fed-
eral deduction because of a carryforward of a net operating loss or any
capital loss.
(2) There shall be allowed a deduction for a carryforward of a net operat-
ing loss or capital loss that is connected with operations in Nebraska.
(3) There shall be allowed a carryback of a net operating loss or a capital
loss that is connected with operations in Nebraska.
(4) The amounts in subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall be com-
puted pursuant to rules and regulations adopted and promulgated by the
Tax Commissioner. Such regulations shall be in accord with the laws of
the United States regarding carryforwards and carrybacks. 3 00
The most controversial adjustment is the exclusion from the tax
base of the dividends that domestic members of a unitary group may
receive from their foreign counterparts. Generally, the Bill provides
for the following adjustment: "There shall be subtracted from federal
taxable income dividends received or deemed to be received from cor-
porations which are not subject to the Internal Revenue Code."30
The effect is that a domestic corporation will not need to include in its
tax base the dividend income received by its foreign subsidiaries.
Proponents of the dividend exclusion were claiming that the taxing
of dividends from foreign subsidiaries resulted in multiple taxation.
John Boyer, in representing International Business Machines, Incor-
porated, stated:
L.B. 1124 would tax the dividends received from non-U.S. subsidiary corpora-
tions. The effect of taxing dividends from these non-U.S. subsidiaries is to
impose multiple taxation on the same earned income. The income which pro-
duced the dividends paid to the U.S. parent by the foreign subsidiary was fully
taxed by the foreign government where the subsidiary does business.3 0 2
The Department of Revenue argued that this foreign source in-
come should be included since otherwise "the [tax] base is unfairly
297. L.B. 1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. § 7(11) (1984). Federal taxable income is defined as
"the corporate taxpayer's federal taxable income as reported to the Internal Rev-
enue Service, or as subsequently changed or amended. Except as provided in sub-
section (7) of section 77-2716, no adjustment shall be allowed for a change from
any election made or the method used in computing federal taxable income." Id.
at § 7(6).
298. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2734(2) to -2735 (1981 & Supp. 1983), with L.B.
1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. §§ 5, 10-11 (1984).
299. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
300. L.B. 1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. § 10 (1984).
301. Id. at § 3(7).
302. Revised Provisions Related to Corporate Income Taxation, Hearing on LB. 1124
before the Revenue Comm., 88th Leg., 2d Sess. 133-34 (1984) (statement of John K.
Boyer, representitive of I.B.M.).
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reduced because some of the expenses deducted were incurred for the
production of that foreign source income. If this were allowed, the
multinational corporation would reduce its Nebraska tax solely be-
cause it had operations overseas." 303 Eugene Corrigan of the Multi-
state Tax Commission testified that dividends received from foreign
subsidiaries were not foreign income but domestic income. Corrigan
analogized the domestic corporation receiving dividends from foreign
sources with a Nebraska individual receiving dividends from a corpo-
ration doing business solely within another state.304 Despite the pres-
sure by the Revenue Department, the legislature made a political
decision and excluded foreign source dividends from being considered
in the tax base.
Other states are not uniform in including dividends from foreign
sources.3 05 Commentators have also discussed the issue at great
length.3 06 Regardless of the justification for including or excluding
foreign source income, the primary result should be to achieve the
greatest degree of internal uniformity.30 7
4. Apportionment
The effect of Kellogg Company in interpreting Nebraska's original
corporate tax scheme to require worldwide apportionment is over-
ruled by L.B. 1124.308 While retaining the familiar three-factor
formula used in the original statutes, 309 the Bill limits the extent of
the factors to domestic values by providing that "[i]n the computation
of the factors only the part of a unitary business group that is subject
to the Internal Revenue Code shall be included, except as provided in
303. Revised Provisions Related to Corporate Income Taxation, Hearing on L.B. 1124
before the Revenue Comm., 88th Leg., 2d Sess. 18 (1984) (statement of Donna
Karnes, State Tax Comm'r, Dept. of Revenue).
304. Revised Provisions Related to Corporate Income Taxation, Hearing on L.B. 1124
before the Revenue Comm., 88th Leg., 2d Sess. 61-62 (1984) (statement of Eugene
Corrigan, Executive Director, Multistate Tax Comm'n).
305. GAO REPORT, supra note 78, at 15.
306. GAO REPORT, supra note 78, at 41-43; Congress and the Taxation of Multijuris-
dictional Corporations, 21 TAX NOTES 451 (1983).
307. See infra notes 314-16 and accompanying text.
308. See L.B. 1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. § 8 (1984).
309. The apportionment provision provides:
(1) Any unitary business having income from business activity that is
taxable both within and without this state shall determine its taxable
income by multiplying its federal taxable income, as adjusted, by a frac-
tion, which is the average of the property factor plus the payroll factor
plus the sales factor.
(2) If a unitary business does not have any property, payroll, or sales
anywhere, then the average in subsection (1) of this section shall be the
average of the remaining factors.
L.B. 1124, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. § 8 (1984).
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sections 12 and 13 of this act."31 0 The Bill relies on this latter provi-
sion to restrict the application of the apportionment factors to a do-
mestic basis while retaining the same language of the original
corporate tax statute that the court in Kellogg Company found was
fatal to the apportionment applied by the Department of Revenue.311
A final change worth noting is that the income of a unitary busi-
ness is presumed to be subject to apportionment, and the taxpayer
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the income is sepa-
rate from the unitary income.3 12 If the taxpayer carries the burden, it
appears that such income may be taxed by Nebraska if another attri-
bution formula is appropriate. 31 3
IV. CONCLUSION
Legislative Bill 1124 has responded to the Kellogg Company case by
amending Nebraska's income tax on multijurisdictional corporations
to reflect a total domestic approach. The response of L.B. 1124 to Kel-
logg Company can be illustrated by the following formula:
Nebraska Property, Payroll & SalesNebraska Federal Taxable Income
Taxable = Less Dividends from X Property, Payroll and Sales of United
Income Foreign Subsidiaries States Parent and Subsidiaries which
have Federal Taxable Income
Both the tax base and apportionment formula are based on domestic
values. 31 4 The impact of L.B. 1124, in relation to the previous formu-
310. IE at § 8(3).
311. The property factor is defined as follows:
(1) The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the aver-
age value of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or
rented and used in this state during the tax period and the denominator
of which is the average value of all the taxpayer's real and tangible per-
sonal property owned or rented and used during the tax period.
IcL at § 18. The payroll factor is defined as follows:
(1) The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total
amount paid in this state during the tax period by the taxpayer for com-
pensation and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid
everywhere during the tax period.
Id. at § 16. The sales factor is defined as follows:
(1) The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales
of the taxpayer in this state during the tax period, and the denominator
of which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax
period.
I& at § 17.
312. Id at § 9(1) (1984).
313. Id. at § 18 (1984).
314. As originally drafted, L.B. 1124 provided for a much different formula as is illus-
trated below:
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las, can be partially illustrated by the example used earlier.315 The
tax liability of the corporation would be computed as follows:
5 15 205 + + 
.266 x 100 = $26.60
3
To determine the tax liability, the domestic income of the corporation,
excluding the dividends received from the foreign subsidiaries ($100),
would be multiplied by the apportionment factor (.266). The tax lia-
bility would then be $26.60.316 The example is illustrative of the fact
that L.B. 1124 is not a formula that is as favorable as the formula that
the Department of Revenue originally proposed, but it is more
favorable than the post-Kellogg formula. In effect, L.B. 1124 reaches a
compromise between the Department of Revenue and the concerns
expressed by the multijurisdictional corporations.
Departing from the original income tax which had been used since
1967, L.B. 1124 has achieved a greater degree of internal uniformity.
The very rationale behind the use of formula apportionment is to at-
tribute income to the taxing state relating to corporate activities in
that state.317 The formula in L.B. 1124 guards against an excessive
amount of income attribution by attributing to Nebraska an amount
proportionate to a corporation's in-state values of property, payroll,
and sales.
Larry D. Hause '84
Nebraska Property, Payroll & Sales
Nebraska Federal Taxable Income Property, Payroll and Sales of United
Taxable = Including Dividends of X States Parent and Subsidiaries which have
Income Foreign Subsidiaries Federal Taxable Income Plus a Portion of
the Property, Payroll and Sales of Foreign
Subsidiaries
315. See supra text accompanying notes 268-78.
316. The tax liability is identical to the formula argued by Kellogg Company in the
Kellogg Company case. See supra text accompanying notes 214-19. This may not
always be the case since the formula advocated by Kellogg Company in a realistic
situation may include many more factors.
317. See Note, supra note 131, at 645. In fact, even if Nebraska would adopt a tax base
which includes worldwide income, the attribution formula would still only attri-
bute to Nebraska that amount of income representing the corporate activities in
Nebraska.
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